

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

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FEATURED IN THIS ISSUE:

Administration in the Halls of Ivy, a Symposium

Initiative and Bureaucracy, by Peter M. Blau

Executive Leaders—Career and Political, by John B. Blandford, Jr.

WINTER 1960

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in this number

John B. Blandford, Jr., "a name writ large in the annals of public administration" as Louis Brownlow has written, has been general manager of TVA, deputy director of the U. S. Budget Bureau, administrator of the National Housing Agency, adviser to many national governments in Latin America, the Near, Middle and Far East, and director of public safety in Cincinnati. He was one of the first public administration interns, assisting Brownlow, then city manager of Petersburg, Virginia, in 1920.

Peter M. Blau has written *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* and *Bureaucracy in Modern Society*. He is associate professor of sociology, University of Chicago, and earlier taught at Cornell and Wayne University. His most recent journal article, "Structural Effect," will appear soon in the *American Sociological Review*.

Emma L. Bowman, editor of *Citizens' Business*, semi-monthly publication of the Pennsylvania Economy League (Eastern Division), also has been PEL research assistant. She worked in the Philadelphia Home Rule charter campaign in 1951 and to defend the charter in 1956.

Harlan Cleveland became the third dean of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, in 1956 after three years as executive editor and then publisher of *The Reporter* magazine. A National Institute of Public Affairs federal government intern in 1939, he spent seventeen years as a U. S. and international organization administrator, including service as assistant director of the Mutual Security Agency and director of UNRRA's mission to Italy and China.

John J. Corson, a management consultant with McKinsey & Company, Inc., has for ten years directed studies of the organization and management of business and government. Earlier he served for ten years as the director of federal bureaus. He has devoted an increasing proportion of his time to educational administration, as executive vice chairman of the Ford Foundation's Committee on Faculty Salary Grants, assistant to the chairman of the President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School, and director of administrative studies of Stanford University, California Institute of Technology, and Beloit College. He is now completing a book on "the governance of colleges and universities."

Harold W. Dodds was president of Princeton University from 1933 to 1957. On his retirement, he began a study of the office of the college and uni-

versity president under a grant from the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Believing that "an academic social scientist is improved by some contact with practice," he has served on numerous governing and advisory boards of the federal government and civic groups, chairing the second Hoover Commission task force on personnel and civil service, and has been an adviser to Latin American governments. He was professor of politics when named to the Princeton presidency.

Algo D. Henderson, professor of higher education at the University of Michigan, teaches from experience in a wide range of positions. Joining the Antioch College faculty as associate professor of accounting, he was promoted to professor, business manager, dean, executive vice president and president. He also was associate commissioner of education for higher and professional education in New York State and was a member of the President's Commission on Higher Education.

Walter H. C. Laves has spent the last twenty years in international administration. Now responsible for public administration technical assistance programs in Indonesia and Thailand as chairman of the Government Department of Indiana University, he was deputy director general of UNESCO from 1947 to 1950 and vice chairman of the U. S. delegation to the UNESCO general conference in 1952.

John D. Millett, a public administration professor at Columbia until 1953 with numerous leaves for service to the federal government, is now president of Miami University, Ohio, and secretary-treasurer of the National Association of State Universities. He is author of eight books, most on public administration, and co-author or contributor to another nine. Millett heads the Education and Training Committee of the American Society for Public Administration.

Lennox L. Moak was director of finance in Philadelphia when the city's first long-range operating program evolved. Before and since, he has done governmental research as director of the Pennsylvania Economy League (Eastern Division) and Bureau of Municipal Research and director of the New Orleans Bureau of Governmental Research. He has been a consultant to numerous government units and semi-governmental commissions and associations and has held short-term executive positions in city and state government.

(Continued on page 32)

Administration in the Halls of Ivy

» University administration is like administration of other enterprises, John Corson assures us, in consisting of decision-making, programing, communication of program, control, and appraisal. But descriptions of what middle and top management of higher education face in undertaking these universal processes may sound highly unusual: for example, participative management in which the administrator is like a majority leader among near-equals—who have scant loyalty to the organization even while acting with deep loyalty to the organization's purposes, units that fight un-Parkinsonlike to avoid new jurisdictions, organizations which seldom have a clearly defined over-all statement of purpose and whose parts are connected geographically and on paper but scarcely by regular operating relationships.

Yet before other public administrators dismiss this as science fiction so far as their work is concerned, they should recognize that some of the causes of university administration's differences are growing forces in their own organizations—for example, employee loyalty to a professional field in competition with loyalty to the organization, employees with so much expertness that outsiders are unable to understand them easily, and severe short-

ages of top flight specialist talent resulting in individual bargaining on pay among other effects.

Also, some administrative approaches advocated generally—such as emphasis on leadership rather than authority and on wide participation in decision-making—are here displayed in extreme form, which can provide guidance to others on the same route.

Administrators of other programs will find many familiar problems discussed here: for example, the persistent encroachment of procedural details and public relations demands on the executive's central job of defining purpose, and the need to find and prepare executives who can be both program philosophers and administrative experts. In addition, they may note in Algo Henderson's study that government and business executives occasionally are attracted to this administrative wonderland.

Finally, to those who regard the dean's dilemma as mercifully irrelevant to them, one might ask why government is turning more to universities to perform its tasks. And one might also look here for clues to overcoming the persistent incompatibility in the increasing marriages of university and government in the holy bonds of research.

The symposium was arranged and guided by James A. Perkins.

The Campus—Forgotten Field of Study

By JAMES A. PERKINS

Carnegie Corporation of New York

It has been said that the university is to the scholar as the water is to the goldfish—taken for granted. While this analogy has features with which some scholars may find cause to quarrel, it is a fact that the university as a social institution has received far less attention than business and government organizations. Journals devoted to the problems of business institutions fill the shelves of our universities. The *Public Administration Review* has given adequate space to the problems of governments. But the same professors have not found their own institutions to be of equivalent interest.

The absence of appropriate attention is fairly evenly divided among the disciplines. Economists have not dealt with the proper handling of endowment, of student fees and

loans, and of capital financing. As a result the debate on federal and state student loan programs has had no informed body of academic opinion to test the merits of the various proposals that were and are advanced. In a recent book, there is an assertion that collegiate experience scarcely influences the basic values of the students who are processed. There was precious little of facts, figures, or theory to either support or deny such a position. And finally, and to the instant point, students of administration in general, and public administration in particular, have given a wide berth to the university as a social organism or administrative entity, and even to its appropriate relation to public authority.

There are signs and portents, however, of

imminent change. The measuring rods and searchlights of the students of administration are being applied to the university. Problems of structure are beginning to be identified, the roles of the chief actors—trustee, president, dean, and faculty member—are receiving expert attention. The processes by which curriculum is devised, the student taught, the budget balanced are now proper subjects for serious study. More general problems of governance involving public bodies, executive and legislative, and their proper relationship to independent academic institutions, public and private, are in process of identification. Last and far from least it is recognized that administration requires administrators and, *mirabile dictu*, it is even believed in some quarters that the laws of pure chance, as the sole guarantor of administrative competence, are unreliable indeed. Training of administrative talent can be thought about and even attempted. The care and nurture of administrators is important and if we aren't careful the dean may even cease to be the subject of the annual Throttlebottom joke.

The four authors whose essays follow are leaders among those who are lending the weight of their experience and prestige to this development. Their papers do not pre-

tend to cover all the various problems and fields of interest that could and should attract the readers of the PAR. But their papers do open a number of doors through which we hope others will pass in increasing numbers.

John Corson is almost uniquely qualified to write on the comparative aspects of academic, business, and governmental administration since he has been a professional participant and analyst of all three arenas. Harold Dodds reminds us forcefully that the academic administrator is not a neutral presiding over a neutral apparatus but must provide leadership in an academic community and that this function shapes his administrative task. Algo Henderson, like Dodds a man with experience in an academic presidency, describes some of the current efforts to identify and train academic administrators. Harlan Cleveland, a relative newcomer to collegiate administration, winds up the series with a lively piece on the man in the middle—the dean.

These papers, let us repeat, are largely suggestive of some of the issues that should attract and excite the student of administration. This exercise will have well served its purpose if problems of academic governance and administration receive recurring attention in this journal.

The University—A Contrast in Administrative Process

By JOHN J. CORSON

McKinsey and Company, Inc.

DOES the administration of a university differ from that of a business firm or a governmental agency? Is the influence of board members less or more in the university than in the corporation? Must university executives—presidents and deans—possess skills not needed to the same degree by their counterparts in private and public business? And the faculty—does it play a greater, lesser, or different role than the core staff members of a business or a bureau?

There is little in the literature of administration that will answer such questions. It

NOTE: The content of this article is drawn from a chapter of a book on "the governance of colleges and universities" to be published by the McGraw-Hill Book Company.

is high time that the college or university be "subjected to the same intensive analysis and study which have been brought to bear on various forms of business and industrial [and I would add governmental] enterprise. . . ."¹

The Universal Administrative Process

The administration of any human enterprise—be it a military, religious, business, governmental, or educational enterprise—consists, other students have demonstrated, of dis-

¹ Logan Wilson, "A President's Perspective," *Faculty-Administration Relationships*, report of a work conference sponsored by the Commission on Instruction and Evaluation of the American Council on Education, May 7-9, 1957.

cernible, interrelated activities.² In summary, it has been contended that administration involves (1) the making of decisions which (2) are programed into a plan for implementation, (3) are communicated to all who must carry them out, (4) are controlled to ensure that they are carried out as programed, and (5) finally are appraised in the light of results and new conditions.³

In what respects does the college or university carry on these five distinguishable administrative activities differently than the business firm or the governmental agency, and why?

This question does not imply that the college or university should administer its affairs as the business firm or the governmental agency. "Good" administration is not necessarily reflected by a "smooth-running machine" nor by a no-nonsense, tightly-coordinated system of activities. "Good" administration is better reflected by the capacity to keep the eye focused on basic ends and to adapt activities to the attainment of these ends. Our concern here is with the discovery of those environmental factors that condition how administrative activities in the university are carried on.

Decision Making—The Central Administrative Activity

Decision-making is the central and continual business of every human enterprise. In the business firm, decisions are made as to products, selling tactics, union contracts, executive compensation, production processes, methods of financing, and a host of other problems. The chief of a government bureau decides questions as to the interpretation of legislation, processes for serving constituents, personnel to be hired and promoted, budgets, and still others. Within a university, decisions are made as to courses, curricula, admissions, the selection and promotion of faculty and nonacademic personnel, the raising of funds, the building of buildings, athletics, student discipline, recreation, and a variety of other matters.

When the ways are compared by which business firms, governmental agencies, and

universities arrive at decisions, three differences become apparent.

1. *The college or university staff is less often guided in making decisions by a single or limited number of clear and generally understood purposes.* For governmental agencies, purpose is usually set forth in legislation (e.g., to protect citizens against adulterated foods, drugs, and cosmetics) and is made more precise by periodic public (e.g., citizens advisory committees) and legislative review (e.g., annual appropriations hearings) of what the individual agency is doing. The public administrator often fails to translate the legislative purpose into precise guides for his staff. But an intelligible statement of purpose exists and frequently is made understood by the processes of public review.

For the employees of a manufacturing enterprise, purpose is set by the product produced (e.g., to manufacture paper products) and is made more precise by the reasonably apparent results in sales and profits. The manufacturer often reaffirms his purpose by a slogan ("comfort conditioned") that gives internal direction even as it provides external identification. The newspaper publisher sets his purpose in terms of an editorial formula that gives direction to writers, editors, and others and tends to establish a distinctive character. The department store owner strives to create a "public image" that identifies his store in customers' minds and guides employee dress, conduct, and sales talk, as well as the kind of merchandise stocked and the way in which it will be displayed and advertised. Notable illustrations of businesses that flounder because they lack a clear purpose confirm the practicality of clearly-stated purpose.

Less often does the multischooled university have a clear, generally understood purpose. President Whitney Griswold of Yale University recently declared that the universities' "sense of purpose is all but smothered, their stated purposes blurred beyond recognition."⁴

⁴ In an address at Johns Hopkins University, late 1958. See also Lloyd S. Woodburne, *Principles of College and University Administration* (Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 145, and Robert M. Hutchins, "The Administrator," a paper delivered before the Summer Program for Federal Administrators, University of Chicago, 1958, in which he argued that "... the leading characteristic of educational institutions today is aimlessness."

² See, for example, the writings of Luther Gulick, Edward H. Litchfield, and Herbert Simon.

³ Edward H. Litchfield, "Notes on a General Theory of Administration," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 3:29 (June, 1956).

The catalog will state a noble purpose in high-sounding terms. The chairman and president will speak of "service to youth." An "intuitive purpose" may reside in the minds of a few trustees, the president, and faculty members. But no explicit statement of purpose will be found in many colleges and universities for all to know and to follow in framing courses, curricula, student housing plans, or athletic programs; in determining what public services shall be undertaken; or particularly in allocating scarce resources among these several activities.

The significance of this lack is made all the more apparent by the success of institutions which have clearly defined and steadfastly pursued a purpose. Wesleyan's dedication to the liberal arts and California Institute of Technology's concentration on the whole-sided training of scientists are but two illustrations; not many could be added, though a clear and guiding—but not dominantly an educational—purpose guides many decisions in the national military academies, some denominational schools, some junior colleges, and a few "athletic" universities.

Students of administration have long contended that a clear guiding purpose is an essential to the effective administration of any human enterprise. But an enterprise concerned with the universality of knowledge and dedicated to the encouragement of inquiry wherever it may lead exists in an environment in which the *precise* definition of purpose is impossible. Forces within (students and faculty) and without (alumni and constituencies) are given, or take, substantial freedom in determining their own purpose. Yet the trustees and presidents, consciously or unconsciously, do define purpose or confuse their deans and department heads by the succession of decisions they make. In an enterprise where goals cannot be clearly defined the demand for leadership is large.⁵

2. *Faculty members have diverging interests and loyalties.* The university's decision-making process is complicated by the intense attachment of most faculty members to their disciplines (anthropology, geology, or zoology) or to the professions (architecture, law, or medicine) in which they are trained—much

more intense attachment than either the business or government employee seems to have to his program or functional specialty.⁶ This commitment to discipline ahead of institution results in conflicts over courses, curriculum, and budgets. Moreover, the professor's "search for the truth" often makes difficult his objective weighing of alternatives and gives rise to conflicts with trustees and administrators over admissions, athletics, budgets, and building programs.

3. *Less responsibility is focused in the chief executive and the governing board.* In the business enterprise, decision-making is usually focused in the chief executive. Though his decisions are reviewed and on major issues approved or vetoed by the board of directors, much authority is exercised by him alone. Similarly in government, the authority for decision-making is clearly in the head of the agency.

In contrast, "under the prevailing governmental system and folklore of American higher education" many decisions as to the basic program of the enterprise—admission of students, courses, curricula, and faculty, and often student affairs—are that of the faculty. "... It is the privilege and the responsibility of the administration and trustees to mobilize and manage the physical and economic resources necessary to support the educational program which the faculty has determined."⁷ And as institutions grow larger the locus of decisions as to courses, curricula, and faculty tends to slide down to the departmental faculty. Even the dean focuses his time and energy on matters of finance, buildings, and public relations.

The environmental cause of this diffusion of responsibility lies in the range and depth of specialization that obtain among the university's staff. "The professor," as Talcott Parsons has written, "is a technical expert who must take a heavy responsibility in an organization where his administrative superiors are almost always lacking in technical ability to

⁵ One university vice president comments that "one learns well the attachment of the professor to his discipline or profession in reviewing faculty expense accounts; only his professional meeting will take him from home and the even tenor of his ways!"

⁷ Philip H. Coombs, Director of Research, Fund for the Advancement of Education, in a talk before the 14th National Conference on Higher Education, Association for Higher Education, Chicago, March 3, 1959.

⁶ Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (Row, Peterson and Co., 1957), p. 16.

evaluate the quality of his work."⁸ The business or governmental executive, who is increasingly having to harness the efforts of technical and professional personnel, may find that the university president's wrestling with this problem charts his way.

The result of this diffusion and decentralization of decision-making is often costly.

Decisions by faculties as to educational program are often the result of compromise among specialists, made without the leavening and stimulating influence of thoughtful leaders of the society who (sometimes) serve on boards of trustees.

The areas of decision-making entrusted to faculties are in practice inseparable from those reserved for the president and trustees: the determination of the educational program or the establishment of admissions policy necessitates financial support, may also preclude increased expenditures for faculty salaries, and may require substantial additional facilities and the raising of funds. The president, when given only a limited opportunity to participate with the faculty in programming courses and curricula, is ill-equipped to make informed decisions on matters of budget, fund raising, and the need for new capital expenditures.

Members of governing boards are frequently dissatisfied with their role even while professing their realization that educational questions should be decided by the faculty. If trustees were permitted to participate more in educational decision-making their most important decision might be made better—the choice of a president.

Programming—Essential Extension of Decision Making

A decision must be put into effect. And implementation requires the programming of a succession of actions.

In business the inextricable interrelationships of manufacturing, sales, advertising, finance, and other staffs impel programming, in more or less formal terms, so that each may understand what the other is doing. In governmental enterprises, similar interrelationships (e.g., between the regional and central offices of the National Labor Relations Board)

tend to compel programming. It is also compelled by two other forces: the necessity of obtaining legislative sanction, usually in an appropriation, before many a decision can be carried out; and the fact that each public official may be called upon to explain, to the press or to citizen groups, what is being done and why!

In most fairly large academic institutions, important nonacademic decisions (e.g., the raising of funds, the construction of a building, or even the annual preparation of a budget) are programmed in a relatively formal fashion. It is less common to find academic decisions (e.g., the modification of course content or the introduction of a new curriculum) implemented by a succession of programmed steps.

Two reasons seem apparent. First, the relatively complete (even if incongruous) separation of academic decision-making by the faculty from economic decision-making by the president and trustees makes the programming of steps involving both difficult. Second, the lack of programming of academic decisions is attributable to the insistence of the academic man upon self-direction. The faculty member engages in group effort less often than his counterpart in business or in government; his teaching and even more his research are largely self-determined and self-executed. Programming, on the other hand, is essentially a group process, and the group decisions direct what shall be done by each member to achieve a common objective.

Communications—Blood Stream of Human Enterprise

Coordination and collaboration in any human enterprise, Barnard has written, is possible only when communication is effective.⁹ Is this generalization equally applicable to business, government, and higher education?

In a manufacturing company decisions as to the volume to be produced, the inventories required, and the selling price all require some minimal horizontal communication among staffs engaged in purchasing, manufacturing, sales, advertising, and finance. Similarly, employees in the mail room, accounting units, auditing units, cashier's cages, and the files of a regional office of the Internal Revenue

⁸ "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organization—II," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 10:39 (September, 1956).

⁹ Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 91.

nue Service must communicate one with another if personal income tax returns are to be processed on schedule.

Simultaneously, there is an accepted need for relaying orders from top executives down through both kinds of organization—private and public. And it is generally agreed there is need for upward communication, from the man in the plant, the salesman, and the clerk to his superiors, even if such communication is not as regularly provided for and fostered.

Is it true that the members of a university faculty, to perform well their teaching and research functions, must continually interchange information and ideas with their colleagues and with the growing administrative staffs? Can it be assumed that there is need for the continual flow of "orders" and information from trustees, the president, and deans to faculty members and, in reverse, a flow of ideas and opinion from the faculty upward?

President Litchfield of the University of Pittsburgh has implied affirmative answers in posing a series of related questions: "Where is the institution," he asks, "in which all faculties enjoy regular and meaningful faculty meetings? Where is the large university which has found an even minimal procedure for systematically enabling one faculty to know what another is doing in fields of obviously mutual concern? Where is the institution in which trustee and administration views are regularly conveyed to the faculty, or in which faculty opinion is freely conveyed to the administration?"¹⁰

There are many who will disagree with him. Many academes will ask: What does the chemistry department have to know about the philosophy department? Basically those who ask this question suggest that we may well think of a university as analogous to a large shopping center in which the departments and colleges are brought together because they share the same or related clienteles, and for convenience can share the same furnace and other needed services. Resolution of these differing viewpoints requires straight thinking on two questions: 1. Even if departments and schools can operate autonomously is there not need for more effective *vertical* communication—from trustees and presidents to faculties

and in reverse—than now prevails in many institutions? 2. And is it true that departments and schools can operate without effective *horizontal* communication? Does not the discovery of knowledge and the advancement of understanding depend, in some substantial part, on interdepartmental and interschool teaching and research?

Regardless of the answer to these questions it is clear that four factors make difficult the achievement of common understanding among the university staff. First, and most important, is the infinitely greater specialization among members of the university staff than is found in industry or government. Second, the individuality of thought typical of faculty members poses especial problems for communication. Third, the hierarchy of deans and department heads in many institutions cannot be directed to communicate and interpret to the faculty as the foremen and division heads in business can be ordered to pass the word along. Fourth, confusion generally prevails as to what matters should be communicated to all on the faculty, e.g., is it useful or wasteful to inform the professor of history as to the cost of a new furnace, and should he be asked to offer an opinion as to whether a new furnace shall be installed?

In summary, these factors make difficult the establishment of a broad context of understandings that welds faculty and staff into dynamic collaboration in creating an enriched educational environment.

Controlling—Seeing That Action Is Taken

A principal task of management is to receive information, to compare this information with some ideal, and to issue orders which it believes will make the enterprise more effective. This task, in the jargon of management, is called "control"—a nasty word in any self-respecting academic community.

The performance of workers in the factory, for example, is appraised in terms of standard unit costs for each operation and in quality. The salesman's accomplishments are measured against earlier-established quotas. The vice president's accomplishments are measured in relation to a profit goal set for his division. In short, the performance of each aspect of the well-managed business enterprise is regularly reviewed against some standards.

Employees engaged in many activities in

¹⁰ *New Dimensions of Learning in a Free Society* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 287.

government are similarly "controlled." The chemist in a public health laboratory may be expected to handle, on the average, an established number of analyses. The adjudicator in a regional office of the Veterans Administration may be evaluated in terms of the number of claims handled. And the clerk in a military materiel center may be expected to complete a stipulated number of "procurements" per day. The executive must assess likely public reaction and judge what is sound public policy in deciding major questions, but that assessment and that judgment will be aided by data as to work to be done and the capacity of employees to accomplish that work.

Standards, usually in terms of cost, are emerging for a number of the university's nonacademic functions. For example, standards are set for the maintenance of buildings and grounds, the operation of dormitories and dining rooms, and even the operation of the library. Standards are being developed by which administrators can "control" the utilization of classrooms. Similarly, the performance of alumni, friends, and faculty in the development campaign is measured against pre-established campaign goals. And even the performance of teachers is partially evaluated by the slide rule when the number of "student credit hours per fulltime faculty equivalent" is used in arriving at decisions.

For many kinds of activities and personal performance—in business, in government, and especially in universities—control in such a mechanistic sense is not feasible. The accomplishment of the development engineer in the industrial plant, of the financial executive of the manufacturing company, of the general counsel of a major federal agency, or of the deputy director of the Bureau of the Budget cannot be measured against tangible standards.

In the university, decisions as to curriculum, faculty selection and promotion, admissions, budgets, and even buildings, must, in the final analysis, be based on judgment as to what will contribute most to the influencing of attitudes and values of young men and women or to discovery of new knowledge. The essential activity of universities takes place in the minds of men. The ideas the scholar's intellect produces and their communication to the minds of students are not susceptible to

comparison with fixed standards. To assess the teacher on the basis of teaching load, grade curves, number of theses directed, number of papers published, and like measures is to place undue emphasis on the insignificant in his job.

As the level of intellectual effort required for the task rises, the applicability of precise standards has less meaning. Control is increasingly exercised through the individual's self-discipline. The administrator and the professional man—in business, in government, and in the university—are "controlled," in major part, by continuing self-appraisal. Only the teacher's conscience really appraises the changes in critical thinking, in attitudes, in appreciation, and in related skills that are induced by his teaching. Only his specialist colleagues can judge the quality and importance of his research. And it is doubtful whether the efforts of the administrator or the professional man would be stimulated by tangible standards against which their performance could be appraised.

The university administrator—president, dean, or department head—does not need (and would not be allowed to use!) tangible standards with which to "control" the performance of faculty members. Most faculty members are sensitive both to student opinion and to the evaluation of their colleagues. What the university administrator needs is the capacity to lead his faculty in a continuing quest for agreement as to improved methods of teaching, counseling, and research that will induce each faculty member to strive to improve his own performance. And in this respect the task of the university administrator is quite similar to that of the business or the governmental executive in stimulating the performance of scientific workers and executives.

Reappraising—The Essentiality of Taking Stock

In business and often in government there are numerous built-in devices for appraisal of the product, the process, and the individual. Such appraisal propels the agency forward and has therapeutic value for the individual whose contribution to the corporate effort is evaluated.

In business the customer gives his verdict on the product in a telling manner. The profit and loss statement appraises over-all performance and frequently is broken down to meas-

ure results by plants and divisions. These built-in devices are supplemented by staff agency analyses (e.g., the comptroller, the quality control staff, the chief engineer). Finally, the performance of individuals is evaluated against sales goals, work standards, or the judgment of superiors. Appraisal is an integral, accepted part of the process of administration.

The reaction of the "customer" is not as influential in telling the public executive the worth of his service, but taxpayers and voters do have ways of expressing their judgments. There is no equally precise substitute in government for the profit and loss statement, but the legislative appropriations committee periodically holds the agency, its program, and its performance up to the light. Staff agencies similarly appraise method, but unit performance and cost data are less often available to aid the governmental executive. Devices similar to those used in business are generally employed to evaluate the performance of individuals, although tangible measures of individual accomplishment are not as often attempted.

In the administration of the university, appraisal processes are less often built in. The "customers," i.e., the students, are by and large submissive and inarticulate in expressing judgments on the substance of the intellectual fare they are fed. The chief executive has no periodical over-all measure of accomplishments. Few universities have staff agencies to assemble data that will aid academic officers to reach better informed judgments as to the accomplishments or even the burdens borne by each department and school.

More important, there is less acceptance of the need for regular reappraisal either of educational product or of teaching. Faculty members, like counterparts in industry and in government, manifest a resistance to change—in courses, curricula, programs, and teaching methods. Innovation, that fragile but vital force for progress in any human enterprise, finds tough going in the typical university. For here the professional staff has greater control over what change shall be made than it has in other kinds of enterprise.

Appraisal of Program. Without either the tools or the acknowledged right to appraise, the president or dean cannot know the educational program for which he must seek sup-

port, nor can he effectively lead in its improvement. Moreover, he has only impressions as to whether classrooms, laboratories, and dormitories are effectively utilized or the library efficiently run. To aid in appraising program, three devices are used occasionally:

1. *"Visiting committees"* (sometimes made up of trustees) are used at a few institutions to appraise the plans, hopes, and accomplishments of individual schools, divisions, or specialized study areas.

2. *Accreditation*—Many presidents would deny that the appraisal of the accrediting association aids them! Yet both general and professional accrediting associations (e.g., the American Council on Engineering Education) regularly inspect or stimulate the faculty to inspect the educational program of the whole institution or of a school or department. Indeed, one president has complained that "our chemistry department is more thoroughly appraised than anything in modern government, business, or the Air Force!"

3. *Management Studies*—Perhaps 200 colleges and universities within recent years have retained management consultants to study problems of organization, purchasing, finance, buildings, and grounds. But these studies together with the faculty's self-studies of educational program and processes have seldom, if ever, added up to an effective appraisal of the whole institution. A fusion of the two is needed that would give a whole-sided appraisal of the institution to substitute for the artificially separate consideration of inseparable elements of a university.¹¹

Appraisal of Teaching. Two basic reasons account for the ineffectiveness of existing processes for the appraisal of teachers:

1. *Confusion prevails as to what is expected of the teacher.* Is he expected to concentrate on teaching? Must he publish the results of research? What proportion of his time should be given to administrative chores?¹²

2. *The notion prevails at most institutions (and there are notable exceptions, viz., Oberlin and Reed) that one cannot evaluate the teaching of another, and that a department head or dean is never privileged to in-*

¹¹ Coombs, *op. cit.*

¹² Logan Wilson, *The Academic Man* (Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 62.

vade the classroom of an individual who has reached professorial rank.

Yet teaching is appraised. Students tell their contemporaries of the teacher's capacity to put across what he has to impart. Sometimes students express themselves candidly to their faculty advisers or to the dean. More substantially, each faculty member is appraised whenever some are promoted in salary or status and others are not. Appraisal is most meaningful when an individual is considered for promotion to tenure rank. The difficulty is that the constructive value of appraisal is lost because no agreed-upon standards exist and the utility of appraisal is not accepted. The concept that a superior is responsible for the growth of his immediate assistants has great vogue in business and government but is effectively abandoned in education after the teacher reaches tenure rank if not before. Appraisal, the foundation of development, continues in the university setting, but the appraisers themselves deny their ability or right to make such appraisals!

At a number of universities "offices of institutional research" are accumulating data and devising means by which the administrator can better understand, if not appraise, the product, program, process, and performance of the teacher for which he has a measure of responsibility. But as yet the administrator's task in the university is made infinitely more difficult than are the tasks of his counterpart in business or in government by the lack of built-in means of appraisal.

A Summary of Contrasts

The processes by which a president or a dean gets things done through a faculty differ from those by which a business executive or a governmental official customarily goes about his work. The academic administrator requires equal imagination and capacity to analyze and greater patience and skills of persua-

sion for he must lead faculty members—and oftentimes trustees—in making decisions for which authority is theirs, not his.

The influence of governing board members in the university is limited in a way unknown to the business director or the legislative oversight committee in government: trustees generally refrain from expressing judgments on the substance of the educational program.

The faculty is granted, by practice and tradition, a greater role in the governance of the university than are its counterparts in business or in government.

The student of university administration must recognize six factors which constitute the context within which the university's administrative processes function:

1. The university's goals are not clearly defined and are comprehensive in character; they provide no specific guiding purpose; they give great opportunity for free play to faculty members and place large demands for leadership on presidents, deans, and department heads.
2. The product or service that the university produces is less tangible than that of many business or governmental enterprises.
3. The customers—the students or their prospective employers—exercise limited influence upon those who make the university's decisions.
4. The faculty is made up of individuals highly specialized in many fields, most of whom are committed intellectually and careerwise to a discipline or profession rather than to the employing university.
5. Like professionals in other enterprises, they expect the right of self-direction in their work and the opportunity to participate in decisions that generally affect the conditions under which they work.
6. The right to participate in the making of decisions is diffused among a greater proportion of the participants than is typical of other forms of organization.

Some Thoughts on the University Presidency

By HAROLD W. DODDS

The Study of the College and University President

AMERICAN university presidents are prone to think that their job is like nothing else in the world. They love to recite the incredible variety of mutually exclusive capacities demanded for success. As a former practitioner in the field, I think they have some cause for these views, although on occasion they may exaggerate the uniqueness of their situation. Nevertheless, I have seen tables of job specifications prepared by trustees and even faculty committees which were marvels of contradiction and inconsistencies.

Administrative Skill: The Pre-eminent Qualification?

Not long ago I was consulted by a trustee of a prominent university in search of a new president. In response to my question, "What are you looking for?" he began to list the job specifications as he saw them. His institution was a multi-service university with a large and diversified staff. The new man, he believed, must first of all be a good administrator in the business sense. Next he must be able to live on good terms with the state legislature so that it would be liberal with appropriations. He must be able to cultivate popularity with the alumni so that they would be generous. He should be a good speaker, reasonably religious, etc., etc. When I interrupted to ask, "Since the end-product of your university is education and scholarship, did it ever occur to you that a man's educational experience and promise as an educational leader were important?" the frank reply bounded back, "Gosh, I never thought of that."

This trustee was not a beginner nor an ignoramus regarding the operations of his university. Perhaps he overlooked capacity for educational leadership because he had seen at first hand what outsiders may not appreciate: how complex a modern university has become. What other enterprise presents a more diverse range of organizational services than are represented by deans, janitors, librarians, athletic coaches, glass blowers, laboratory technicians including curators of pregnant hamsters, treasurers and Sanskrit scholars, to

mention a few. All must be financed and attended to, else education will not proceed.

It is natural that a businessman should consider administrative ability, as he is familiar with it to be the pre-eminent qualification for a president. Certainly a president should possess a reasonable command of the elements of administration. Yet some succeed who seem to pay slight regard to accepted principles of administration while others who stress orthodox procedures fail. Undoubtedly administrative potential, measured if possible by administrative experience, is an asset which trustees properly take into consideration, for clearly management competence contributes to academic potential in a university situation. But administrative capacity in the usual sense is only a launching pad from which an educational leader takes off, and not a ceiling. Nevertheless launching pads are not to be despised.

The truth is that on the academic side our liveliest colleges and universities operate under a sort of organizational anarchy in comparison with the ordered regularity and hierarchical structure which business strives to attain. This is not to say, however, that, as America continues to develop giant universities, present administrative organizations and procedures are adequate, nor that much of value cannot be drawn from business and governmental practice. But improvement will call also for some revision of faculty attitudes towards the importance and function of the administrative process.

In America, in fact if not in law, the president is responsible for every aspect of his university. He is its chief executive. Attempts to divest him of final responsibility for business and fund raising operations in order to free him to be an educator have not succeeded, for reasons obvious to the readers of this magazine.

Organization for Thought

If a university's functions were confined to business operations alone, the role of the president as chief executive would be more simple

and the job specifications clearer. It is his responsibility for promoting education and scholarship and the financing thereof that challenge a president's capacity as an administrator, for orthodox business practices require some modification in order that they will promote and not hamper the effectiveness of teachers, scholars, and students.

A university possesses a sort of schizophrenic personality arising from the constant internal struggle between its team-play organizational requirements, which involve discipline and prescribed regulations, and its mission to develop individuality and self-expression in faculty and students. The supporting business activities are—or should be—organized for action. The scholarly and teaching function—the substantive purpose of a university—is organized for thought. It is not by chance that the non-academic element in a university's administration is more hierarchical, more ruled by direction, more geared to attain physical results than the academic element. Traces of what Woodrow Wilson described as "the perennial misunderstanding" between men who act and men who write are present every day in face to face dealings between these two groups in a university.

Foreign observers of American universities criticize us for making too much of administration. They contrast our more elaborate administrative machinery unfavorably with the less elaborate organization of British and Continental institutions of higher learning. True, they usually fail to take into account the greater size of many of our universities and the broader and more democratic range of their services, some of which do not pertain to European universities at all. Nor do our British friends, for example, yet fully realize that the increasing size and complexity of their universities is inevitably leading them to enlarge their administrative organizations and to view administrative skills more highly. It is of some significance that today one can hear speculation at Oxford about transforming the rotating vice-chancellorship into a permanent office, after the pattern of the Scottish and English civic universities.

American faculties are inclined to agree with foreign critics that our administrative organization is too elaborate, forgetting that much of the need for it has been created by faculty demands themselves. Notwithstanding

faculty criticism, I am inclined to feel that on the whole those American universities which have had the courage to spend money on administration have been the ones which have shown the most progress. Nevertheless, the faculty is fully aware that the highest academic honors do not go to the organization man; they are reserved for the pathfinding scholar and stimulating teacher who by temperament is more inclined to resist the requirements of organization than to suffer them gladly. A university does not exist to advance a party line. Indeed its duty is to provide conditions favorable to challenge and controversy, for it is by these means that new truth is discovered and validated.

The job of the president as an educator is to combine in reasonable harmony the centripetal forces which advance the university as an organization and the centrifugal, individualistic forces which tend to pull it apart, so that each may serve the other well. Obviously it is easier said than done. He leads by integrating (in the language of Mary Follett) divergent and often strongly held views, including his own, rather than by mere compromise. A little experience soon teaches him that, while a decision on a controversial matter achieved by compromise of pressures may look all right in the faculty minutes, it will enjoy but limited success, if any, when it comes to be carried out.

Plant Management, Public Relations, and Educational Philosophy

The transformation which the office of university president has undergone since the turn of the century is expressed in the oft-quoted observation of Professor William Lyon Phelps that when he visited President Noah Porter's office he found him reading Kant, but when he called on his successor he found him reading Yale's balance sheet. The figure must not be taken too literally, but it does suggest what has happened. In many instances, the effect has been to alter and frequently to diminish the president's position as an educational leader. On the other hand, the president who fails to provide the necessary wherewithal can have little hope of being respected as an educational leader, even within his own faculty.

The degree of change varies greatly as among institutions and personalities, but generally university presidents fear that they are becoming increasingly remote from the edu-

cational life of their institutions and grieve under it.

There are those who question whether the chief executive of a modern university, burdened by cares of plant management, public relations, and money raising, will be able to function as a practicing educator at all. Let him find some good deans, they say, and delegate all educational problems to them. His role as glorified plant superintendent and chief public relations officer and money raiser will carry the bonus of a certain ritualistic grandeur on ceremonial occasions. I cannot accept the proposition that good number two men can compensate for an inadequate or otherwise preoccupied number one man in respect to the educational function which a university is created to serve. If this view should come to prevail, as I fear it may, the future is dark for higher education in the United States.

But it need not prevail. I believe that the role of the presidency as an educational power can be preserved, indeed restored to something like it used to be.

Balancing Educational and Public Demands

If this is to be accomplished, some far-reaching modifications must be made in the structure of his responsibilities and in the demands which both the academic constituency and the public generally make on him. The modern president labors under many distractions which bear little relation to his main job. In the popular image of him, a good bit of the figure of Mr. Chips still lingers. Whether he likes it or not, he is a public figure. He is supposed to sit on many platforms, to grace by his presence many events that have only the most remote, if any, relation to the internal conduct of his institution. The public expects him to be personally accessible and professionally available in a way that a governor of a state will understand. These demands are heavier in some university situations than in others, and I know that it is easy for one to preach who was relatively protected from them (though not as much as would have been good for my institution). When a president turns away from being generously available in order to devote energy to his institution, he exposes himself to criticism, but he may be surprised and gratified by the manner in which many come to understand and approve. Moreover, a

president who puts himself in too great supply may find that his market value has dropped accordingly.

Nevertheless, the public relations aspects of the post have grown to proportions unmatched in previous educational history, and they demand attention. In company with heads of business corporations, the president has discovered that public and governmental relations calls for more and more of his time, whether his institution be publicly or privately supported. One might almost say that there is no such thing as a private college or university any more; they are all in the public domain. Even the so-called Ivy League presidents, whose institutions have behind them a stronger tradition of self-determination than some others, find themselves directly concerned with problems touching political opinion and governmental relations.

The president is the chief interpreter of his institution to the public, and the picture which the public holds of it is to a considerable degree a reflection of their image of him. To this end, he should possess a reasoned philosophy of education and of the goals for which his university is striving; a philosophy which he can express with clarity and conviction not only to academic colleagues in their language but to all sorts of lay audiences who seem always to have their own obdurate philosophies of education. Thoughtful Americans have a right to look to college and university presidents to identify the great social issues as they relate to higher education and to take a stand. Unfortunately, public relations seem more to involve counteracting unfavorable publicity than affirming deathless principles.

Problems of Specialization

But the obstacles to being an educator are not confined to the business, financial, or public relations side, or to the extraneous demands on his time. The vast development in specialization of subject matter with which a university deals also contributes. No head of a modern university can presume to have as intimate a knowledge of subject matter as his predecessors could command in a simpler day. Indeed, efforts to qualify as a specialist may do him more harm than good through narrowed vision in respect to the whole university. Nevertheless, while he cannot vie with the specialists as to specialized knowledge, he is not

absolved from the responsibility to be a well-informed generalist, intellectually equipped to influence broad developments. Today the world is crying for generalists to supplement the deficiencies of the specialist, and in being one, the president will find rich intellectual rewards. The complaint that there are no intellectual satisfactions possible in the presidency is incorrect. Yet, I repeat that the problem of the president's responsibility for educational policy has been rendered more difficult today by the fact that he has to coordinate so many specialists' interests.

The pressures of specialized interests struggling for more recognition and more financial support have, as Beardsley Ruml has pointed out in vigorous language, weakened the interest and competence of a faculty, as a body, in respect to policy decisions affecting the overall pattern of the university.

"Democratic" Administration and Leadership

One frequently hears that today's presidents no longer are a match for the giants of the past. They have degenerated into operators and able-bodied mendicants. They have lost the innovating dynamism of a Harper of Chicago, an Eliot of Harvard, a Gilman of Johns Hopkins, an Andrew D. White of Cornell, a Woodrow Wilson of Princeton; men who by their charismatic talents wrought sweeping innovations which spread beyond their own institutions.

This indictment overlooks the change in the nature of successful presidential leadership which broader faculty participation has wrought in the decision-making process; a change which in some ways has made leadership more difficult without reducing its urgency. There are men at the head of our universities today who will stand up under analysis with the notable figures of the past, but their visibility is lower because they now share the helm with the faculty more than their predecessors did. Academic freedom has come to embrace more than individual freedom to teach, write, and speak. It has come to include a high degree of faculty autonomy, in practice if not in law, in respect to academic appointments and promotions, salary determination, courses of study, degree requirements, and related areas. Increasingly common, also, is the practice of consulting the faculty on matters

such as campus planning, university development programs, design of buildings, fringe benefits, and conditions of employment.

In no realm is faculty opinion more decisive than in the selection and promotion of its members (though it is perhaps equally dominant on curriculum). In a modern university, selection and promotion usually originate in the form of a recommendation by a department of instruction (a specialized segment of the university). From there it moves to the appropriate dean. Some place along the line, usually only in cases of assistant professors and higher, a cross-departmental faculty committee or even a committee representing the whole university may sit as an advisory board of review. True, the president is not legally required to accept any of these recommendations, but he cannot escape each step of the faculty consultative procedure, and it is a rash head who would recommend a professorial appointment without the endorsement or at least the cheerful acquiescence of the department in which the candidate will work.

This strong departmental discretion in selection and promotion tends to strengthen built-in forces of deterioration which the president and his administration must counteract. The quality of the faculty is a personal responsibility from which no president should seek to escape.

When applied conscientiously, the system of faculty committees of review can supply potent help to the president in sustaining and improving the quality of the faculty and thereby the quality of the institution. I suggest, however, that research will reveal a positive correlation between long-run faculty excellence and the manner and quality of presidential participation in selections and promotions. There are a goodly number of university presidents, although not so many as in the small colleges, who find time for rewarding attention to faculty appointments and who, as educators, consider it their most significant obligation. Naturally in complex institutions, effective presidential influence in faculty personnel administration will relate chiefly to the advanced posts, particularly those which carry permanent tenure.

Leadership in Place of Authority

I have no intention of attacking faculty self-government as it has developed or is develop-

ing nor of pleading for a return to the earlier days of autocratic presidents, however dynamic. All I have been trying to do is elaborate the problems of the university president under today's conditions. The fact that Napoleon's methods are not available to him does not absolve him of his duty to lead. Success relates to qualities of tact, patience, persistence, intellectual and emotional competence, intuition, tolerance, good health, an energetic personality able to lead by consultation rather than through mandates or directives, plus administrative skill in implementing these qualities. An awesome catalogue, I admit. A university presidency is no job for one who is unhappy unless he is playing to the grandstand. If a president derives but small pleasure from helping others realize their potentials and receive the credit therefor, he is miscast.

Faculties are notoriously conservative as to educational innovations. The paradox that a profession so free in criticism of others should be so tender in criticism of itself has often been remarked.

Some presidents have assured me that for them to become identified with any substantial educational innovation would mean the kiss of death for it. In all countries with which I am familiar, though in varying degrees, there is a sort of natural antagonism between faculty and administration—or at least watchful suspicion—of faculty towards administration. It is more in evidence in the United States than abroad. The gap between faculty and administration may be wide and dangerous or it may be narrow and healthy, for it is by resolving tensions that any organization escapes death through stagnation. The situation is exacerbated in the United States by memories of the struggle which came to a head fifty years ago between faculties and autocratic presidents and dictatorial trustees who had little understanding of what a university should be.

While this issue still persists between boards and presidents on the one hand and faculties on the other, the faculties have won the struggle in our pace-setting institutions, and the time has come for them to forget it. Yet even among them its melody lingers on in the form of a continuing faculty distrust of delegated powers—particularly in respect to officials but extending sometimes to its own committees under the false impression that delegation is un-

democratic and unbecoming to a profession which in theory, if not in practice, is thought of as a society of equals.

A Commitment to Education Plus Skill in Administration

To restore the presidency to the point at which it will be pre-eminently an educational post first requires that the incumbent desire that it be done. Unless he has a profound commitment to education and to a university as a way of life, he will always tend to be diverted to other matters. If he has such a commitment, he will develop ways to fulfill it. He may not realize it, but if an incumbent has not found that leadership in educational policy has become the ultimate payoff of the job, if the pleasure he derives from it is insufficient compensation for the ancillary matters he has to attend to, he will be happier as a business executive. His weekends will be freer, he will have no parents, students, faculty or alumni to deal with, and his pay will be better.

Given the commitment to education and an educational philosophy and goals to match it, a president will build all the organizational strength he can in the area of the university's business and supporting services and delegate wide discretion to it. To this end he must strive to attract good men who are able to command greater financial rewards in other work but who may be susceptible to a university call.

Unfortunately, the faculty complaint that the universities' supporting services are poorly administered may be well grounded. Faculty acceptance of essential regulations will be much easier if it feels that the business side is being conducted efficiently. Housekeeping and financial management is not an end in itself. Its role is to supply an adequate physical plant and sufficient material resources to enable the faculty to function best as individual teachers and scholars, and the students as individual learners, in an atmosphere which should both demand and cultivate among teachers and students the widest play of individuality and imagination.

Subordinates Sympathetic to Peculiarities

To succeed, those immediately in charge of business operations under the president must be sympathetic to the peculiarities of faculty

and students. The experienced businessman who first undertakes to work for a university often finds that he must undergo some radical psychological adjustments to a society in which the decision-making process is more widely dispersed than in business. Many decisions on plant operation affect the faculty in some respect and frequently involve their participation. The president cannot escape responsibility for achieving efficiency and economy in a manner which will reduce to a minimum tension between the business side and the faculty.

More Efficiency, but . . .

The frequent criticism of management consultants who survey colleges and universities is that the presidents and their staffs lack appreciation of and competence in the art of administration, even in the academic sphere. The charge is that the administrative organization is not well structured; areas of authority and responsibility are not well defined; the processes by which decision-making operates are fuzzy and dilatory; administrative officers are unwilling to accept responsibility or the president is unwilling or unable to delegate it. Decisions are not clear-cut and prompt; the faculty gets the runaround. The university staggers along under ill-defined goals and suffers from the absence of a built-in system of continuous self-appraisal.

Unfortunately, there are elements of truth in these charges. Yet a university president or board of trustees obsessed by business efficiency along the more bureaucratic models of either government or industry may be undermining the purposes which the institution was founded to serve. It is always to be remembered that it is great individuals not great organization men that make a university great; and the administration truly succeeds only as it is able to discover, release, inspire, and channel creativity and self-expression under conditions of wide faculty self-direction and self-appraisal. To paraphrase the comment of a friend, the danger is that too heavy concentration on administrative orderliness, may drown the still, sensitive voice of intellectual inspiration in the clamor of administrative machinery.

Nevertheless, it is indisputable that a president profits from a reasonable command of the art of educational administration. Presidents

should study to cultivate it, remembering that academic administration rests basically on the same elementary principles of human relations which apply to modern business administration, particularly concerning delegating and organizing clearly. In this region the survey recommendations of management experts have contributed some wise observations.

A basic requirement for presidents is faith in the principles of organization, not only an intellectual awareness but a convinced belief that the head cannot do it all; that if he tries to do so he will fail. At least he must emotionally accept the fact that others are often more apt to get it done than he is, even if they will not do it as well; and then there is the probability that they will do it better.

To readers of this *Review* this may seem a point too trivial to raise, but one should remember that most presidents who succeed come from academic life and that, from graduate school on, a professor's professional career has involved organizational considerations quite the opposite of values inculcated in a young Ph.D. A wise president, like a wise business executive, delegates educational as well as physical operational responsibilities as far down the line as he can. And he will keep them there despite contrary pressures in which academia abounds, a feat often not as easy as it sounds.

To Lead a Democratic Institution

The purpose of delegation of routine educational operations is to leave the president free for faculty and student contacts at strategic points in ways that will count most. The more the faculty and students accept him as "one of us," the greater will be his influence. A president is normally surrounded by a little group of top administrators of whom only one or two may be on the academic side. These are the people who report directly to him. The danger is that he may not get beyond this circle, a fate which he should energetically resist.

Clothed in the prestige of his office, a president has a score of methods available to lead his institution in change and growth. Two particularly should be mentioned. He should be alert to new ideas among the faculty. They will often be worthy, more worthy than what may drift in more easily from extramural sources. For this reason he will, as much as he

can find time, cultivate informal opportunities for association with faculty, even students, as well as with his administrative group. Through them he will learn what is going on beyond what the deans report. And while he is picking up new ideas, he will be insinuating ideas of his own; he will be testing them out on others and preparing the way for acceptance of what he wants to do.

He also must not be afraid to propose innovations, knowing full well that they will arouse criticism and resistance for they will threaten vested interests and loyalties to the status quo. He must be able to come through all this without loss of the basic respect of the faculty and without searing his own soul. He cannot afford to bruise easily and he must not take criticism too personally. A professor who differs with the president is not always, by any means, a "trouble maker."

A second practice which should also be made a matter of habit is the cultivation of a zeal for improvement. Whatever procedures exist for performance appraisal throughout the university, he will in all his associations seek to engender the spirit of self-examination and ambitions for greater excellence. As in any other organization, the gravest dangers arise when things seem to be going to everyone's satisfaction.

Nevertheless, a satisfactory design of the presidential office cannot be attained by the incumbent alone. The university constituency must temper their demands on the president's time. For example, attendance at football games should be voluntary and not compulsory, as it sometimes is. The public should appreciate that the president has more important tasks than making public appearances and should be sympathetic rather than critical when he declines. Governing boards should

help block for him against extraneous pressures rather than joining in the pressures themselves.

Governing boards also can help by not expecting the president to be master of every detail which comes before them and by encouraging him to entrust to his top administrative colleagues the mastery and presentation of matters over which they are specially responsible. Boards can also help by granting broad administrative discretion to the president and by insisting that only substantial matters come before them for action. Unfortunately, there are still places where trustees encroach on his energy by fussing over trivialities. A correlative of this is, of course, the president's obligation to consult with his board, frankly and with complete integrity, on matters of importance or of controversy while still in process of formulation. Obviously, the more the board trusts the president the more business will it entrust to his discretion and decision.

Nor is the faculty devoid of responsibility in this area. Although, as I have indicated, the nature of presidential leadership has changed or is changing to accommodate itself to greater faculty participation in decisions, faculties should come to a more mature understanding of the function of administration. While not denying their right to means for "keeping the administration honest" and without surrendering their claim that their professional discretion be honored in decision-making, they should accept the limitations of direct democracy in complex organizations, including universities as well as governments.

On the other hand, presidents should not be content with anything less than success as educational leaders and trustees should learn to demand that they be so. Efficiency in managing supporting activities is not enough.

Finding and Training Academic Administrators

By ALGO D. HENDERSON

University of Michigan

IT matters little whether one accepts a prediction of 50 per cent increase in college enrollments or of 150 per cent, a shortage of college administrators stares us in the face. But it is not only numbers that we need. Numerous state and national surveys warn us to prepare for greater diversification of higher education programs, more complexity of structure within institutions, and better coordination within systems of colleges and universities. With all of this, we must maintain our concern for the quality of the immediate product as well as for the contribution to national cultural advance to keep up with technical progress. We need to stimulate support from the public to obtain funds commensurate with the demands of youth for enrollment and of the public for services.

All of these problems converge upon the academic administrator. The administrator is the key to the issues of progress versus chaos, distinction versus mediocrity.

From Where Do Officers Come?

To shed light on where to find potential presidents, a study was made of the biographies of seventy-eight recently-named presi-

dents.¹ Only four-year and non-Catholic institutions were included. Some new presidents may not yet have "made" *Who's Who*; the interpretations therefore may be slightly biased in favor of men with Ph.D. degrees and those who have previously held positions of distinction.

The average age of the presidents in the year of taking office was 47-48. Inasmuch as 17 of them had changed from other presidencies, the most common age of first appointment may be as low as 45. Other data are shown in Table 1.

Certain facts stand out clearly from this table. A deanship is a good stepping stone to the presidency. Assistants to presidents also have a good chance, and presumably good apprenticeship. Over 70 per cent of the new presidents either had been president of another college or had held one of these high administrative posts.

The Ph.D. degree, held by over two-thirds of the presidents, is an accepted qualification

¹ They are those listed in *Who's Who in America* who had been identified by recent issues of the *Bulletin of the Association of American Colleges* as having been newly appointed to the office.

Table 1
Background of 78* Newly Appointed College Presidents

Highest Degree ^b	Field of Special Study				Previous Position	
PhD	53	Social Sciences	Humanities		Administrative Position	
ScD	4	History	English	4	Deans	25
EdD	3	Theology	Languages	4	Another Presidency	17
MD	2	Political Science	Classics	3	Assistant to President	13
JD	2	Economics	Speech	2	Public School Superintendent	1
MA	7	Psychology		—		
MS	1		Professional	13	College Teaching	
LLB	3	Sciences	Education	9	Professors	10
BS	2	Mathematics	Law	5	Professions	
BA	1	Chemistry	Public Administration	4	Lawyer	1
BD	1	Zoology	Agriculture	3	Minister	1
		Physics	Engineering	2	Army General	1
		Geology	Medicine	2		
		Astronomy	Journalism	1	Industry	
				—	Industrial Management	4
				13	Foundations and Associations	5
				26		

* Due to variations in the available data, the qualifications do not add exactly to 78.

^b In a few cases the degree may not have been an earned degree.

Table 2
Backgrounds of 85 College Deans

Highest Degree		Field of Study		Previous Position	
PhD	55	Social Sciences	Humanities	Professional rank	26
EdD	8	Economics	English	Department chairman	19
ScD	4	History	Speech	Other deanship	13
DBA	1	Psychology	Romance Languages	Assistant dean	11
MS	6	Counseling		Personnel Assistant	5
MA	3	Philosophy		Government	4
MEd	1	Sociology		Foundation	2
BA	4			Assistant to President	2
BCE	2			Industry	1
BPh	1	Sciences	Professional		
		Mathematics	Education		
		Chemistry	Engineering		
		Physics	Business Administration		
		Zoology	Agriculture		
		12	41		

—apparently more so today than fifty or even twenty-five years ago. The classics, once a primary source, have lost much ground; but whether the humanities as a whole are now trailing badly depends upon how one classifies theology and history, both shown above among the social sciences.

A second study involved college deans of liberal arts, education, engineering, business administration, and student personnel services. Of 100 in the sample, 50 were relatively new to the position and 50 were not; 85 deans returned the questionnaire. Their backgrounds are shown in Table 2.

In another study, the records of the 53 top academic administrators in a single university were studied to ascertain what their next previous employment had been: 57 per cent had been promoted from within the university; an additional 15 per cent had come from other colleges and universities, 15 per cent direct from graduate study, and the remaining 13 per cent from the professions and government service.

Other research confirms that the most common source for the recruitment of new presidents was from the office of dean.² Some of

the studies found a higher proportion of presidents than in our sample coming directly from a professorship. But, as shown in Table 2, most deans have been professors in any case. Perkins found that 77 per cent of the presidents had been faculty members and 83 per cent had had some previous experience in higher education. Kunkel stated that 75 per cent had come out of college circles, approximately 14 per cent from the ministry or the priesthood, and the remainder from public schools, the professions, and the armed services.

If the normal progression is from professor to dean (perhaps by way of departmental or committee chairmanship) and from dean to president, the implication is clear that most institutions expect both their deans and their presidents to have been teachers and scholars.

Does the Education Fit the Job?

This route may seem to give to these officers the education they most need for their roles: they have an acquaintance with the problems of teaching students and of searching for knowledge. Looked at more critically, however, what the man brings to his new responsibility when he comes fresh from teaching is mainly an intensive knowledge of some particular academic field. This qualification, while appearing essential, may also be parochial. Should not a dean or a president be deeply interested in and concerned about the problems facing higher education in the broader sense? Should he not have done some research or possess knowledge and skills re-

² J. E. Gordon, "The President: Has the Pattern of College and University Leadership Changed?" 24 *Journal of Higher Education* 135-40 (March, 1953); B. J. Kohlbrenner, "Some Elements of Background Among University Presidents," 68 *School and Society* 283-85 (October 23, 1948); B. W. Kunkel, "The College President as He Is Today," 34 *American Association of University Professors Bulletin* 344-49 (Summer, 1948); J. A. Perkins and M. H. Perkins, "From These Leadership Must Come," 70 *School and Society* 161-64 (September 10, 1949).

lating to research on these problems of higher education? Should he not himself be an example of a person of breadth of interests, of substantial general education, motivated to read actively in this new field—college administration? These questions raise the further one, to be discussed later, as to how a teacher or research man in a specialized field may transform himself into an educator in the broader sense.

Dodds (above) states that the primary role of the president is educational leadership; many other writers have agreed, President Harold Stoke of Queens College concluding, for example, that "The most important qualification a college president can bring to his job is a philosophy of education"³ to give the institution a sense of direction and to serve the president every day as a guide for administrative decisions. Why does the institution exist? Whom is it trying to educate? What kind of education is it trying to provide?

The roles of the dean and the president carry them far afield from their academic specialization of history or mathematics. In a way, the nonscholarly activities of fund raising, plant erection, and public relations are integral to the function of educating, but they consume enormous amounts of nervous energy and interfere seriously with the performance of the role as chairman and leader of the faculty. Previous scholarship in Latin or in chemistry does not prepare a man to work with architects or to sell budgetary deficits to donors or legislators. Nor does it prepare him to deal effectively with temperamental and cantankerous faculty. Although success in these aspects of administration may often be the result of special qualities of personality, the high rate of turnover in presidencies may in part be caused by fumbling due in turn to lack of administrative training or experience.

These observations also point up a danger and a dilemma. If the president of the future must know more about public relations than about Elizabethan literature, will this discourage the professor from eventually becoming the president? Will the scholarly president be succeeded by the football coach? The im-

plications for the future objectives and academic standards of colleges and universities are serious. The answer may be that the administrator needs both a substantial knowledge that is essentially historical, philosophical, and cultural and a knowledge of administrative principles and practices.

The problem is how to discover the future administrator earlier and how to compress all of his necessary education within a reasonable time period.

Normally, the search for a president or a dean involves elaborate inquiries about potential candidates, much screening of the opinions of references, and some interviewing of the most highly rated individuals. This process, however, is hit-or-miss and often becomes badly distorted by pressures from interested groups. In my observation of the performance of numerous presidents, I would estimate that at least half of them are not well qualified for the role. If this is true, can the selection process be improved?

In other professions and occupations, some advances have been made in identification and recruitment techniques. The army, for example, takes pride in its system for choosing general officers. In some states, plans have been developed for testing and interviewing potential school administrators. Although I doubt whether candidates for a presidency would or should submit to a Miller Analogies test or the Edwards Personality Profile, I see no reason why appropriate tests and other personnel procedures might not be developed for use at the junior administrative level. As shown above, the large majority of presidents have had some previous apprenticeship; and it is during this period that the systematic search for presidential timber might well be made. The colleges need to be alerted to the value of cumulative personnel files for their junior administrators that will reveal their growing potentialities. They need to become more aware of the value of systematic training experiences for these younger men, whether apprenticeships in their own institutions or periods of study and internships at centers or institutes organized for this purpose.

The Education of a College Administrator

In order to determine the content of an education program for future college admin-

³ *The American College President* (Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 161.

istrators, we need to analyze further what is meant by "having a philosophy of education" and "having some knowledge of the theory and practice of administration."

Developing Educational Philosophy

An administrator needs historical perspective. The history of higher education can be a disciplinary subject in itself. In it there is plenty of room for research and for the writing of fresh interpretations of higher education as it has evolved. An example will clarify the statement that historical perspective is needed by a dean or a president. Many professors think of the college curriculum and teaching methods as well established and not subject to much change. History tells us, however, that there have been many patterns of curricula over the centuries, emphasizing at successive periods the trivium (grammar, logic, rhetoric), quadrivium (arithmetic, music, geometry, astronomy), the classics, theology, the elective plan, general education, and so forth. Likewise the professor turned dean or president needs to be aware that there have been many fashions of teaching in the past, including rote learning, explication of the text, lectures, discussion, case and laboratory methods, and now the new interest in television.

Another aspect of the acquisition of a philosophy of education is to reflect upon the purposes of higher education. For example, was Moberly's view about orientation to the Christian ethics essentially sound? To what extent do particular philosophies, such as Dewey's theories of learning, apply to college? Under pressures to educate more and better technical men, should the colleges reduce further the content of the humanities and social sciences? How are universities in other parts of the world meeting the educational problems of the space age? To what extent should democracy serve as a frame of reference? Did Jefferson's plan of screening students on the basis of merit provide equality of opportunity in the democratic sense, or should one instead turn to the equalitarianism of Jackson? When it is said that we are no longer concerned merely with the education of individuals but must now cultivate our human resources, does this constitute a new orientation of purpose? Or, more concretely, what should be the role of the public community colleges?

It seems clear to me that the prospective administrator needs to have a philosophy. In a curriculum, courses in the history and philosophy of higher education can be organized toward this end; and for in-service personnel, special institutes or seminars may be offered. However, every dean or president has it within his own power, if he will but take the time, to read intensively and to discuss his readings with his associates and colleagues. If he says he does not have the time, I would answer that this may be the most important use of his time. "The president must seize, as his right, upon the rare privilege of being an educated man."⁴

Learning Administration

It may be easier to develop a curriculum to teach university administration than to teach educational philosophy since public administration, business administration, and school administration courses have already broken much ground. In certain respects, college administration resembles these fields; it involves planning, organization, implementation, and coordination. It is dissimilar, however, in that in a very real sense the faculty is the institution and the president or dean must be more than an employer and director; he must share in the thinking and creative work of the faculty and be both their guide and spokesman. He must be able to weld together as an institution the centrifugal professional interests of which Cleveland and Dodds speak here.

But if he is to provide genuine educational leadership, he should not only know techniques of administration but should have both breadth and depth of education, symbolized by the possession of the doctor's degree. To provide opportunity for the study of administrative theory and practice and yet keep it within bounds so that genuine breadth of education also may be attained, the objectives need to be reduced to a few essentials. I suggest the following: an alertness to and understanding of the problems of higher education; an acquaintance with curriculum design and administration; some special study of human relations, including personnel administration; some knowledge about the de-

⁴Douglas M. Knight, "Walking Nightmare: or How Did I Get Into This?" 44 *Association of American Colleges Bulletin* 645-52 (December, 1958).

velopment and financing of higher education and the coordination of the programs and finances of related institutions; and an understanding of the principles of organization with some knowledge of procedures and of good practices. Within the scope of such courses, the five stages of the administrative process, as developed here by Corson, may be studied.

Programs for the Preparation of College Administrators

Since most deans and presidents are recruited from academic ranks, presumably they have had little or no training for the role of administrator. Some in-service programs have been launched in the form of institutes, seminars, or course offerings especially designed for part-time students. To after-hours and Saturday courses at the University of Michigan, one liberal arts college sent its president, two of its deans, its business manager, and several department heads. To fulltime summer sessions, one college sent its newly elected president, followed the next summer by the dean, the assistant dean, and five department heads.

A few universities operate institutes for college administrators; others provide workshops for junior college personnel. The best known of these is the Institute for College and University Administrators, affiliated with the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard. Each year for approximately a week, new presidents, new deans, and personnel officers meet in their respective groups for discussion of cases on administration. Another instance is the Institute on College and University Administration at the University of Michigan where presidents and deans are brought together for a week of study and discussion with resource leaders. The University of Omaha has been noted for its Annual Short Course in College Business Management. Still another variation is the annual seminar for college presidents where they read selected books and discuss ideas.

These programs are growing in number and extent and suggest that any administrator who really desires to participate can probably find the opportunity to do so.

Another type of development is the postdoctoral program. The purposes are to discover potential administrators of the highest

type and provide them with additional education. The North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, for example, operates a leadership training program each year for fifteen young faculty members or junior administrative officers from member institutions. They attend workshops on the examination of institutions for accreditation and accompany examining teams. The University of Michigan has a program of Michigan Fellows in College Administration. Each year, five or more fellows aged 25 to 40 are selected from among faculty or junior administrators who appear to have unusual promise as administrators. They spend the year at the University under a stipend and with postdoctoral privileges. They may audit courses and seminars, and they meet once a week. They may undertake internship experiences, do research and writing, and visit other institutions. Experience indicates that most of the fellows move immediately into deanships or other substantial administrative positions.

Some of the programs described above, notably those at Harvard, at Michigan, and at the North Central Association, have received substantial financial support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The Carnegie Corporation also has fostered research relating to the problems of higher education at the Center for the Study of Higher Education, University of California (Berkeley) and the Institute of Higher Education, Teachers College, Columbia University.

Timing of Administrative Training

The postdoctoral programs assume that the best time to select the potential administrator is during the period when he is approaching the right age for an administrative career. This timing has two advantages: he will have completed his normal academic education and will have engaged in some teaching or preliminary efforts at administration; and he will have been motivated toward administration. Thus, in some respects, the postdoctoral fellow makes the ideal student in college administration because he is ready for further study in preparation for educational leadership. Although a foundation has been financing the initial experiments along this line, if the programs are successful they point the way to a new venture by which colleges might send selected individuals under a sabbatical or in-

ternship arrangement to a university that provides the program.

Doctoral Degree Programs

One more plan for the preparation of college administrators is the doctoral degree program in higher education. Universities that have been making substantial contributions have included California, Chicago, Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, New York University, Ohio State, Stanford, and Texas. Approximately eighty universities offer some courses in college administration.

Most of these programs are located within the Schools of Education of the university, the curriculum consisting of a major in "higher education." In some cases, as at California and Michigan, the course work is organized through Centers for the Study of Higher Education which have universitywide advisory or sponsoring committees. At Michigan, we are working out interdisciplinary degrees with the research focused upon higher education. The reason is that future administrators may be found in any academic or professional area and their preparation is a task for the whole of the university.

Some years ago, a considerable number of universities began to offer courses to prepare student personnel officers. This movement coincided with one by the colleges to replace paternalistic personnel setups with organizations headed by trained deans who are

possibility for a similar development in the preparation of academic deans and presidents. Doubtless this overstates the prospect. Presidents and deans will continue to emerge from many sources. However, there is good evidence already that doctoral programs in higher education are turning out an increasing number of young men and women professionally prepared for various kinds of administration.

Future Demand for Administrative Education

A study of the tenure of deans and of presidents, as shown by a selected sample, indicated that approximately 20 per cent of each group had been appointed within the most recent year (though the average tenure of presidents appears to be somewhat more than 5 years and of deans 12.7 years). Applying the 20 per cent turnover figure, nevertheless, to the 1,400 senior institutions in the United States, about 280 new college presidents and 280 deans of liberal arts will be needed annually, plus deans for all other colleges. At the community-junior college level, during the ten-year period 1947-57, 486 colleges representing approximately 80 per cent of the total number changed their top executive 487 times. The annual requirement for community-junior college president was therefore about sixty.

Top level administrative positions in higher

Under pressures to educate more and better technical men, should the colleges reduce further the content of the humanities and social sciences? How are universities in other parts of the world meeting the educational problems of the space age? To what extent should democracy serve as a frame of reference? Did Jefferson's plan of screening students on the basis of merit provide equality of opportunity in the democratic sense, or should one instead turn to the equalitarianism of Jackson? When it is said that we are no longer concerned merely with the education of individuals but must now cultivate our human resources, does this constitute a new orientation of purpose? Or, more concretely, what should be the role of the public community colleges?

Indiscriminately, the demand for college graduates in techniques of administration but should have both breadth and depth of education, symbolized by the possession of the doctor's degree. To provide opportunity for the study of administrative theory and practice and yet keep it within bounds so that genuine breadth of education also may be attained, the objectives need to be reduced to a few essentials. I suggest the following: an alertness to and understanding of the problems of higher education; an acquaintance with curriculum design and administration; some special study of human relations, including personnel administration; some knowledge about the de-

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which a maximum of authority has been "delegated upward" to the issuers of orders by those who subsequently receive them. Somewhere near the other end of the long and colorful spectrum of administration, you will find an academic dean working with a faculty. Here administration is horizontal in the extreme. The members of the platoon have refrained from delegating much of their hard-won authority to the sergeant; they expect him neither to drill nor to instruct. In the academic world, the premium is not on collective orderliness, as at Parris Island, but on cheerful orderliness, as at Harvard.

Examples can doubtless be found of even more extreme forms of horizontalness in administration. The resistance of physicians to the striving for conformity that is supposed to be the hallmark of modern large-scale organization probably exceeds, by some quantitative measure that yet eludes the social scientist, that of college and university professors. But an academic faculty certainly is irregular enough to invalidate much of the generalizing from personal experience in hierarchical organizations which serves us as general theory in the field of public administration.

My assignment here is to set down some personal observations on the role of deans as "middle management" in the academic world. The word "management," with its heavy connotative freight of efficiency and good order, applies dubiously, if at all, to academic ad-

ministration. But that is not the question at hand. The question is: what is the role of the dean? The answer is best expressed by the description of a dean as not intelligent enough to be a professor and too intelligent to be a college president.

Thus in faculty folklore, administration is the lowest form of subprofessional endeavor on the campus. Naturally it lacks the intellectual quality of teaching and book-writing, but it lacks, too, the sense of artistry (the "thingness," a philosophy professor might say) that lends a certain dignity to the work of janitors, campus policemen, the food service, and the buildings-and-grounds crews. The administrators create nothing, initiate nothing; they exist to serve the faculty—and since they keep forgetting that this is their primary role they must be periodically reminded of it on public occasions by exquisitely worded shafts of faculty wit.

This mythology is of course an indispensable element in the dynamics of a college or university. It explains the otherwise inexplicable: that administrators by and large get higher salaries, ampler office space, larger travel budgets and more secretarial help than the other members of the academic family. Since teaching and scholarship are the purpose of the academic enterprise, how can the favored treatment of administrators be justified except as the distressingly materialistic inducements required to make sure that somebody, almost anybody, will step forward to perform the paper-pushing tasks whose mar-

ginal role is to keep the academic machine running. Another instance is the Institute on College and University Administration at the University of Michigan where presidents and deans are brought together for a week of study and discussion with resource leaders. The University of Omaha has been noted for its Annual Short Course in College Business Management. Still another variation is the annual seminar for college presidents where they read selected books and discuss ideas.

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Some years ago, a considerable number of universities began to offer courses to prepare student personnel officers. This movement coincided with one by the colleges to replace paternalistic personnel setups with organizations headed by trained deans who approached student problems professionally. Within a relatively brief time, it became the practice for colleges and universities to choose professionally-trained personnel officers. By analogy, one might reason that there is some

possibility for a similar development in the preparation of academic deans and presidents. Doubtless this overstates the prospect. Presidents and deans will continue to emerge from many sources. However, there is good evidence already that doctoral programs in higher education are turning out an increasing number of young men and women professionally prepared for various kinds of administration.

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Top-level administrative positions in higher education must considerably exceed 1,000 for each year, in addition to thousands of lesser administrative jobs. Their selection and preparation is obviously a major and immediate task.

The Dean's Dilemma: Leadership of Equals

By HARLAN CLEVELAND

Maxwell Graduate School, Syracuse University

AT Parris Island, South Carolina, on April 8, 1956, a Marine drill instructor named S/Sgt. Matthew C. McKeon barked an order to a platoon of recruits, and they promptly marched into water over their heads. Since some of them could not swim, they drowned; and a few of them at least must have reflected

on that possibility ahead of time. But the published reports of the ensuing investigation failed to reveal that any of the recruits seriously considered not obeying Sgt. McKeon's marching orders.

That Parris Island platoon is probably the limiting case of "vertical administration," in

which a maximum of authority has been "delegated upward" to the issuers of orders by those who subsequently receive them. Somewhere near the other end of the long and colorful spectrum of administration, you will find an academic dean working with a faculty. Here administration is horizontal in the extreme. The members of the platoon have refrained from delegating much of their hard-won authority to the sergeant; they expect him neither to drill nor to instruct. In the academic world, the premium is not on collective orderliness, as at Parris Island, but on cheerful orneriness, as at Harvard.

Examples can doubtless be found of even more extreme forms of horizontalness in administration. The resistance of physicians to the striving for conformity that is supposed to be the hallmark of modern large-scale organization probably exceeds, by some quantitative measure that yet eludes the social scientist, that of college and university professors. But an academic faculty certainly is irregular enough to invalidate much of the generalizing from personal experience in hierarchical organizations which serves us as general theory in the field of public administration.

My assignment here is to set down some personal observations on the role of deans as "middle management" in the academic world. The word "management," with its heavy connotative freight of efficiency and good order, applies dubiously, if at all, to academic administration. But there is no question about the other word. The dean is by definition in the middle. The position does have its compensations: the academic dean has more contact with the substance of education than the president and trustees and affects the allocation of more resources than the fulltime teachers and scholars.

Executive in a Legislative Situation

The mythology about deans is clear enough. On every campus a whole *genre* of humor on the subject is transmitted in song and story from generation to generation. The newly-appointed dean can confidently expect several dozen people to tell him, ha, ha, that the definition of a dean is a mouse trying to act like a rat—or, in the purer corners of the humanities division, as a rat. Within a college or university faculty, the accepted hierarchy

of values is best expressed by the description of a dean as not intelligent enough to be a professor and too intelligent to be a college president.

Thus in faculty folklore, administration is the lowest form of subprofessional endeavor on the campus. Naturally it lacks the intellectual quality of teaching and book-writing, but it lacks, too, the sense of artisanry (the "thingness," a philosophy professor might say) that lends a certain dignity to the work of janitors, campus policemen, the food service, and the buildings-and-grounds crews. The administrators create nothing, initiate nothing; they exist to serve the faculty—and since they keep forgetting that this is their primary role they must be periodically reminded of it on public occasions by exquisitely worded shafts of faculty wit.

This mythology is of course an indispensable element in the dynamics of a college or university. It explains the otherwise inexplicable: that administrators by and large get higher salaries, ampler office space, larger travel budgets and more secretarial help than the other members of the academic family. Since teaching and scholarship are the purpose of the academic enterprise, how can the favored treatment of administrators be justified except as the distressingly materialistic inducements required to make sure that somebody, almost anybody, will step forward to perform the paper-pushing tasks whose marginality to the real business of education is expressed in the pejorative term "overhead"?

The difficulty most of us have in understanding the nature of academic administration is due in part to the general tendency to describe it with words and concepts borrowed from hierarchical structures. But these words describe poorly the actual workings of a faculty. For academic administration is in its important essentials a legislative process. The faculty, like a body of legislators, is plural; if a chart were to be drawn, you would need a roll of paper long enough to spread all faculty members out on it horizontally. The dean is at best a majority leader with access to significant forms of patronage; on some issues, he may have to settle for acting as leader of the minority.

The essential characteristic of academic life is thus a fierce conviction that each of its participants is in important senses free and

equal, empowered to decide within wide limits both the direction of his own scholarship and the composition of his own teaching load. Some of the members, to be sure, are more equal than others. But power does not ride with position to the extent that it would in a government bureau or corporate enterprise. The influence of the individual faculty member is paradoxically compounded of long tenure with a single institution plus the known ability to move elsewhere at the drop of a hat.

Organizing Un-Organization Men

To illuminate the stage on which the dean (and to some extent the department chairman, too) must play his peculiar role, it may be useful to compare the dynamics of hierarchical bureaucracies with what happens in a faculty.

If in a hierarchical organization you place on the table a new function which the organization must perform, you can count on a more or less polite struggle developing as to who will handle it. The success of each unit chief is measured by the progressive enlargement of his unit's responsibilities. Fully two decades before Parkinson's law was published, Chester Barnard argued that an organization's survival and growth is the only valid criterion by which the organization can be judged—or, indeed, can judge itself. By aggrandizing itself, each unit of a hierarchical organization helps aggrandize the organization as a whole: Charles E. Wilson was in the main intellectual stream when, on the assumption that General Motors is a part of the United States, he implied in his famous "vice versa" that what was good for the part was good for the whole.

Not so, or at least not necessarily so, in the administration of an academic faculty. Place a new organizational function on the table at a faculty meeting and you are well on the way to losing your audience entirely. The dynamics of a faculty are centrifugal, not centripetal.

The reason is not far to seek. A scholar-teacher's career does not depend *primarily* on his position within the power structure of his own institution, it depends on his reputation in his own field of specialization. The research chemist will get to the top of his profession

through chemical research, not by sitting on university committees to work out a freshman general-education program in the arts and sciences. It is more relevant to an anthropologist's career for him to fathom the tribal symbolism of a remote village than to study the equally curious mythology of his own college. The man who is trying to decide whether Shakespeare was really a reactionary in the midst of the Protestant Reformation can hardly be bothered to spend an evening a week representing an abstraction called "the humanities" on a universitywide committee on long-range building plans.

The professor's primary life is therefore lived in his professional field. The basis for his self-esteem, a mirror of the esteem of others he admires, comes largely from outside the formal structure that hires and pays—but often cannot fire—him. The fact that his students, not to speak of janitors and townspeople, regard him as a savant and call him "doctor" to prove it—this he takes for granted. It is the friendship and professional regard of his colleagues in his own department and in similar departments across the nation that he covets most—because it is hardest to come by. For it is they who have some reason for an opinion: they can be presumed to see his journal articles and read his books.

Even the professor's position inside his own academic structure depends ultimately on his regional or national reputation in his professional field. He will be esteemed the more if his colleagues and his administrative controllers, as they move about at educational conventions and intellectual soirees, find him mentioned with approval and admiration; and by the same token, if he seems unknown in his own field or is regarded by his functional peers as superficial or passé, he will find himself being passed over by the people who regulate travel funds, control faculty "loads," decide who teaches the 8 a.m. classes, and determine which faculty offices will be supplied with new bookcases.

When it comes to salary, the professor's bargaining power on the inside is, for better or worse, directly correlated with his marketability on the outside. Nothing is so helpful to a dean trying to get a raise for a professor as his ability to say the institution will lose the professor if an outside offer is not matched. One or two good competitive offers

a year, carefully leaked to the rumor network in time to influence next year's academic budget, will keep the salary escalator working satisfactorily, without all the bother of actually packing up and moving to another institution.

The dependence of professors on outside rather than internal reputation also helps to explain another fact which both baffles and pleases the new academic administrator. In a hierarchical organization, there is normally a difficult problem of internal communication because people are wary and over-polite about each other. People in bureaucracies know instinctively that "the less I say about him, the less he is likely to say about me." In a government agency or business firm, blocks to internal communication are nearly always a major management problem. Not so in an academic faculty. From the very moment he assumes office, the dean will find a disarming and sometimes jarring frankness on the parts of those faculty members who are secure in their outside positions.

Leader in Search of Consensus

The external reputation of individuals is only half of faculty dynamics. It is the controlling factor in the individual's position as a claimant on the institution's resources and its administrators' goodwill. But it does not necessarily determine the individual professor's position in that oligarchical power structure for which "faculty democracy" is the favored euphemism.

In spite of the onrushing hordes of "overhead" administrators, who in some institutions now take up more than 50 per cent of the salary budget, every faculty manages to retain for itself some real power to make important decisions, or at least to veto them. The list might typically include promotions (especially as to academic rank), research leaves and other services to the faculty, revisions of the curriculum, approval of degrees including the honorary variety, and legislation about the conditions of academic freedom. In the structure of influence to handle such matters as these a professor's national distinction as scholar or his widespread reputation as a lively teacher is by no means the major portion of his segmented ticket of admission to the elite. Personal effectiveness and skill

in negotiation are perhaps the most important factors. But seniority and long tenure also count for much.

As in other legislative processes, the rule of seniority is combined with a periodic popularity contest to select the elite corps of perennial surrogates for the masses (except the "majority leader," who nonetheless is normally appointed by and with the advice and consent of the faculty). In order to qualify for continuing leadership, the members of the elite have to be sharp, tough, and honest—the kind of people you would expect to survive in legislative leadership, but not necessarily the kinds of persons who win popularity contests for executive roles in the world of national or state politics.

Faculty voting is often by proportional representation, which is subject here as elsewhere to the abuses of bloc voting and overrepresentation of intransigent minority views. The resulting "aristocracy of tenure" manages the elective committees, and the same opinion-leaders are naturally selected by the administration to serve in appointive posts as conduits to the faculty at large. As in other segments of our highly-organized society, the leaders who serve on these committees are expected to complain vigorously about the proliferation of committees and the terrible administrative burden they have to carry.

It is doctrine in public administration that a committee can make collective decisions only on matters that do not contravene the vital interests of any member. In academic administration, too, the normal posture of a committee member is one of complaisant apathy until the vital interest of his department or discipline is at stake; on most matters, professorial courtesy is as strong a tradition in the monthly faculty meeting as senatorial courtesy is on Capitol Hill. Thus it is that the only curriculum revisions that do not breeze through the faculty screens erected to "maintain standards" are those which seem to raise jurisdictional issues: the eyebrows of the sleepest economist will twitch, for example, when the engineering school brings up "Economics for Engineers." But generally no questions are asked; the asker would expose his next proposal to withering cross-fire if he identified himself as a carping critic in fields outside his own.

The approval of curriculum through fac-

ulty committees is of course dubious procedure in any case. Every academic dean soon learns the standard ploy, which is to pour new wine into old bottles. If a new faculty member wants to teach a new course, the old-timers in almost any established institution can, with a little research, unearth an approved course number and description which can serve as a suitable vessel for the new material.

Experienced faculty members practise the familiar arts of legislation, notably log-rolling: "you approve the promotion of my colleague and I'll approve the promotion of yours." They sometimes tend toward policies strikingly similar to those of craft unions. When faculty groups discuss their own salaries, which they do frequently and with well-justified anguish, the net result is usually not to make proposals for increasing the salaries of the profoundest scholars, the most aspiring teachers, and the most externally marketable "stars," but to direct their efforts toward raising the minimum wage for each professorial grade. The unhappy result is to skew the incentive system in a manner that hardly persuades the good teachers to stay and the weak ones to look for some other line of work.

The term "faculty democracy" implies a system of voting by majority rule. But a better analogy is the Javanese tradition of gotong-rojong. In Java's villages, the leaders talk things out until there is agreement on a course of action. (In Indonesian national politics, the spirit of gotong-rojong was reflected in President Sukarno's classic reply to a press-conference question as to why he did not form a government with the three non-Communist parties, leaving out the Communists, which would still leave him an overwhelming majority: "Have you ever seen a three-legged horse?" he said.) In our own culture the jury system or the Quaker meeting operate by consensus. As in an academic faculty, the tendency is to postpone or pass over issues on which there is no clear consensus, which of course gives the small but dedicated minority a special kind of veto over changes in the *status quo*.

Fluid Drive for Centrifugal Force

The function of the academic dean then may be described as the deferential manipu-

lation of an essentially legislative process. The process involves a maximum of apparent referendum and a minimum of overt initiative on the dean's part. Just as a legislator can gain a point by associating his own cause with the rights of legislatures generally, so a faculty leader always has in reserve one debating point of devastating potency. "I disagree with the dean about this," he can say. "Shouldn't we show the administration that the faculty cannot be dictated to?" Most groups, on or off a campus, will not regard any idea as acceptable unless it is considered as partly the product of the group's initiative. Academic faculties are no exception to this natural law of human relations.

The dean not only works with his faculty, he represent it in arguments with the president—or, in large institutions, with that vague, oblong, undifferentiated entity known as "the central administration" or "the front office." In this relationship he will find little nourishment in the principles (if such they be) of scientific management.

In managing his financial affairs, he must not be taken in by articles in the *Public Administration Review* describing the virtues of central budgeting. As the man in the middle, the dean's influence with his own faculty is directly proportional to his ability to lay his hands on additional resources that are divertible to faculty purposes—salary increases, research grants, travel opportunities, consulting jobs, summer workshops, and the like. Survival in academic administration therefore is the lot of those who are fittest to participate in the institution's budgetary shell game.

Flexibility is to be found in a large number of budgetary bird-baths, representing a wide variety of financial sources, intermingled in the most complex possible manner. The goal of excessive complexity is all too easily reached.

The rewards for survival in the jungle of academic administration are many. Professor James McCamy of the University of Wisconsin says that professors are vowed to poverty and chastity in exchange for the freedom to eat lunch only with friends. For the "middle manager," this freedom is somewhat more restricted unless his friends are all moneyed folk. Yet the dean's opportunity to live in a company of colleagues unashamed of their

intellectuality; the stimulation of his daily contact with campus life; his chance to circulate in the off-campus world as a representative of and salesman for organized brainwork are great rewards. Few tasks in our society offer so much and provide a monthly paycheck, too.

The price of this energetic but congenial work is the dean's willingness to learn that in management of academic organizations, unlike that of corporations and bureaucracies, the premium is on casual informality rather than rigid structure, on informal consensus rather than formal procedures for action. Academic administration is advanced not by the

rearrangement of solid particles but by chemical reactions in a liquid solution.

"If a man's thoughts are penetrating and his way fluid, while his plans are marvelously clever, such a one is called a strategist." So wrote Liu Shao in *The Study of Human Abilities* seventeen hundred years ago, during the politically chaotic period of the Three Kingdoms in China. He might have been setting up the recruitment criteria for a present-day academic dean. Few deans are penetrating thinkers and even fewer are marvelously clever; but we all apprehend by instinct that Fluid Drive is the central principle of academic administration.

The Science of Administration?

... The electronic computer was discussed ... as an increasingly important tool of management, not only for accounting and other house-keeping functions, but also as an aid in the making of complex management decisions. It seems to me that this ... will require that administrators abandon the vague, almost incomprehensible (to the physical scientist) terminology in which the literature abounds, and replace it with more concise and objective statements. This should, in turn, bring the administrator and the physical scientist closer together—perhaps close enough so that each will understand the other's language!

Strangely enough when the foregoing possibility was mentioned, along with the corollary that it presaged the increased use of numbers and measurement in management, some dyed-in-the-wool administrators objected. They felt that there would still be processes which one should not attempt to measure objectively, even if it were possible. It seems that, among the social scientists at least, there is not universal agreement with Lord Kelvin's famous dictum that knowledge which cannot be expressed in numbers is of "a meager, unsatisfactory kind."

Administration, however, like meteorology, is a relatively primitive discipline. Both sciences seem to have in common strong protagonists of widely divergent points of view, as witness our perennial arguments between the dynamicist, the synoptician and the statistician in meteorology. Yet I have the feeling that in both sciences, each strong argument brings us closer and contributes to an optimum answer to the problem. In this sense, the meetings were both instructive and rewarding.

—Jack C. Thompson, Executive Assistant to Deputy Chief (Plans), Weather Bureau, U. S. Department of Commerce—Evaluation report on ASPA Management Institute, Bloomington, Indiana, October 11-16, 1959.

The Silent Revolution in Patronage

By FRANK J. SORAUF

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WITH little fanfare and only quiet celebration the movement to install merit systems in place of the older patronage is well on its way to full victory. The federal government has almost completely been conquered by one form or another of merit appointment, while the traditional political machines, long the major consumers of patronage, are everywhere else in hurried retreat. And the scholars and administrators who for so long fought in the vanguard of the movement now savor a triumph in practical affairs of the sort rarely vouchsafed to intellectuals.

The case against patronage, based largely on the need for administrative expertise and professionalism, is overwhelming. But only rarely have the opponents of patronage stopped to worry about the effects on the parties and political system of abolishing it.¹ Some scholars of political parties have argued that patronage is important to the political process, but there has never been an attempt to compare the merit system's contribution to good administration with its supposed weakening of the party system in the total balance of effective government.

Such a comparison may not be necessary,

¹ One would, however, have to mention three specialists in public administration who have recognized and addressed themselves to the conflicting needs of party and administration. See especially Harvey C. Mansfield's paper on "Political Parties, Patronage, and the Federal Government Service," in the American Assembly volume, *The Federal Government Service: Its Character, Prestige, and Problems* (Columbia University, 1954), pp. 81-112. Also relevant are Richard E. Neustadt's review, "On Patronage, Power, and Politics," 15 *Public Administration Review* 108-114 (Spring, 1955) and James R. Watson, "Is Patronage Obsolete?" 18 *Personnel Administration* 3-9 (July, 1955).

➤ No one needs to tell the professional administrator in a "boss"-run City Hall that the future of patronage affects him. In merit-dominated agencies, the question has equal but different interest. There, the career executive has many concerns with politically-sensitive issues and works closely with political executives, so he must keep track of political trends.

It is argued here that the trend of declining patronage will affect not only local politics but the national party system and the entire political process.

however. Patronage is slowly dying out—more from its own political causes than from the campaigns of civil service reformers. However substantial the need of the parties for patronage fifty or even twenty years ago, the need is vastly less today. On the one hand, the organization, functions, and style of American politics, and the consequent need for patronage, have changed dramatically in the last generation; on the other hand, the nature and usefulness of patronage itself also have changed.²

Uses of Patronage

Patronage is best thought of as an incentive system—a political currency with which to "purchase" political activity and political responses. The chief functions of patronage are:

Maintaining an active party organization. Experienced politicians maintain that the coin of patronage is necessary to reward the countless activities of an active party organization. The

² Very few studies exist of the actual operation of patronage systems across the country. Among the few are: David H. Kurtzman, *Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia* (published by author, 1935); Frank J. Sorauf, "State Patronage in a Rural County," 50 *American Political Science Review* 1046-1056 (December, 1956); and H. O. Waldbry, *The Patronage System in Oklahoma* (The Transcript Co., 1950). In the absence of specific reports and data, one can only proceed uneasily on a mixture of political folklore, scattered scholarship, professional consensus, and personal judgment.

promise or actual holding of a political appointment, they report, is necessary to induce the canvassing of neighborhoods, mailing and telephoning, campaigning and electioneering, and other activities of the local party organization. Illustratively, many a city hall or county court house rests vacant on election day as its denizens go out to man the party organization.

Promoting intra-party cohesion. In the hands of a skillful party leader, patronage may be an instrument of party cohesion, edging defecting partisans back into the discipline of the party hierarchy and welding the differing blocs within the party into a unified whole. In one sense President Eisenhower's historic agreement with Senator Taft in Morningside Heights represents an attempt to enlist the support of the Taft Republicans in 1952 by promising them consideration in the party's appointments.

Attracting voters and supporters. The patronage appointment often may be used to convert the recipient (and a large portion of his family and friends) into life-long and devoted supporters of the appointing party. Gratitude for the job will win his support for the party, it is said, and a desire to retain the job by keeping the party in power will enforce it. In some urban areas of Pennsylvania, experienced party men calculate that a well-placed appointment should net the party between six and eight voters. The same reasoning, of course, lies behind the appointment of representatives of special blocs of voters, such as ethnic, national, or religious groups.

Financing the party and its candidates. The cruder and more overt forms of this function of patronage have long been known to the fraternity as "macing" the payroll. In the heyday of patronage in American politics, something close to 5 per cent of the appointee's salary was thought a fair return to the party for its benefice. Patronage, always reward for past activity as well as inducement for the future, may also be used to reward a recent contribution to the party coffers.

Procuring favorable government action. Less commonly acknowledged, perhaps for its dubious ethics and legality, is the use of patronage to secure favorable policy or administrative action for the party or its followers. At the local government level it may involve the

fixing of a traffic ticket, preference for certain applicants for public assistance, the calculated oversight in a public health inspection, or the use of public equipment to remove snow from private rights-of-way. By exploiting the appointee's dependence on the party, the organization reaps the political advantages of a preferred access to public policy-making.

Creating party discipline in policy-making. This last function of patronage redounds less to the advantage of political parties than to presidents and governors who use appointments to build support for their programs in legislatures. Franklin Roosevelt's wily use of the dwindling federal patronage, especially his delaying of appointments until after satisfactory congressional performance, scarcely needs more than mention. A number of governors still have at their disposal a vast array of political jobs to use in coordinating executive and legislative policy and in joining the separated powers of government.

But patronage may certainly be misused in ways that adversely affect the parties and political system. It may build up personal machines or followings that parallel and compete with the regular, formal party organization. Poorly administered, it may cause new resentments and hostilities, create more friction within the party than it eases. Also, patronage seldom can perform all of the six purposes at once since to use it for one purpose is to destroy its effectiveness for another. For example, appointments that solidify and activate local party organization may disturb centralized party unity at a higher level and impair party discipline within both party and legislature.³

Just how well patronage has performed the six functions for the parties over the years is a matter for considerable conjecture. Partisans usually claim patronage is the "life-blood" of American politics, and yet even among its most devoted and skillful users, many dissent and some are ambivalent. James Farley, for example, has boasted that he could build a major party without patronage, and yet he dissented from the recommendation of the second Hoover Commission that rural postal

³ I have questioned the political usefulness of patronage at greater length in "Patronage and Party," 3 *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 115-126 (May, 1959).

carriers be taken from the patronage lists.⁴ The scholarly studies of patronage and general political folklore indicate that it is fairly effective in maintaining an active organization and, to a lesser extent, in attracting voters and supporters, but that its value in performing the other functions is highly questionable. Political appointees do contribute money to the party treasuries but hardly enough to run a party today. As for the promotion of party cohesion, the intra-party bickering and bitterness occasioned by the division of the spoils is, to this observer, truly staggering.

Decline in Usefulness

Regardless of the effectiveness of patronage in the past, it is today undergoing rapid changes, most obviously in its steady shrinkage. One observer has estimated that the federal patronage available to the Eisenhower Administration has "... not exceeded a fraction of one per-cent of the total federal establishment."⁵ A precise estimate of the number of jobs still under patronage in city, county, and state administrations throughout the country would be impossible to come by, but all hands agree it is declining.

There do remain states where merit systems have made few inroads into patronage and where large numbers of positions (about 50,000 in Pennsylvania, for example) remain at least technically available for distribution by the victorious. But even in these instances the parties are using a steadily decreasing percentage of the jobs for political purposes because patronage as a political currency has been devalued. Merit systems make their greatest inroads into patronage in the well-paid, specialized positions where the call for expertness and training is greatest. The parties are left the less-desirable, poorly-paid positions generally. With continued economic prosperity and high levels of employment the economic rewards of these jobs, hardly princely in most cases, are less appealing than formerly. While low pay and chronic job in-

security plague the patronage jobholder, private employment has become progressively more attractive with rising wage levels, union protections and securities, unemployment compensation, pension plans, and fringe benefits. Viewed by most Americans as a short-term, desperation job alternative, the patronage position has lost considerable value as a political incentive.

Patronage also is losing its respectability. Its ethic—the naked political *quid pro quo*—no longer seems to many a natural and reasonable ingredient of politics. Parties often find that the attempt to clean political house after an election produces public outrage and indignation. The mores of the middle-class and the image of civic virtue instilled by public education extol the unfettered, independent voter rather than the patronage-seeking party-liner. The public-spirited citizen rather than the self-interested party worker is celebrated. And the public no longer tolerates the presence of political mediocrities in public service in the name of party loyalty.

Even the job-seekers themselves no longer accept the political obligations of their appointments as readily as once they did. Briefly, patronage has fallen into public disfavor for appearing to approach an outright political payoff, with the result that its usefulness to the parties has diminished.

Changes in Parties and Politics

The partial passing of the boss and the political machine has been perhaps the most obvious new development in party behavior. Depending heavily on the motive power of patronage, these machines long dominated big city politics and some county and state strongholds as well. They flourished especially in those urban centers inhabited by large groups of immigrants and minorities—groups not yet integrated into American life, often poor and insecure and bewildered by the traditions of American politics. The machine spoke to them in the simple terms of a job, of sympathy in city hall, and of food and fuel to soften the hardest times.

This is not to suggest that political machines have vanished or even that they will vanish within the next generation. But the machine, and the politics of the underprivi-

⁴ The claim is in James A. Farley, *Behind the Balloons* (Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1938), p. 237, and the dissent in the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Report on Personnel and Civil Service* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 91.

⁵ Mansfield, *op. cit.* note 1 above, p. 94.

ledged on which it rests, is surely on the decline. Government and other private agencies have taken over the social welfare functions these organizations once provided. Furthermore, first and second generation groups, traditional recipients of the attentions of the machine, are disappearing, and their children and grandchildren now luxuriate in the prosperity and conformity of the suburbs, though in many cities their place will be taken for a time by immigrants from rural areas of the United States. In sum, rising levels of prosperity, higher educational levels, declining numbers of unassimilated groups, and greater concern by government for the unfortunate all point to a decline of the boss and machine and of the patronage they relied on.

Furthermore, party conflict since the 1930's has reflected social and economic appeals to a greater extent than in the preceding decades. Even though they do not yet approach the ideological fervor of European campaigns, American politics has become more involved with issues and less with the issueless politics of patronage, favor, and preferment. Campaigning, too, has shifted from the door-to-door canvass, local rallies, and controlled blocs of votes to the mass media and advertising agencies. Great, attractive candidates serve as the focus of these national campaigns. As a result the importance of the national party organization is increased—the center of party power shifting away from the local units just as clearly as the center of governmental power is shifting from the states and localities to the national government.

The New Party Worker

What is emerging, then, is a system of political organization more compatible with the middle-class values of suburbia than those of the ethnic or racial neighborhood of the urban center. Rather than relying on the organized party hierarchy, it depends more and more on the volunteer and *ad hoc* political groups and personal followings. In some states, such as California and Wisconsin, party leaders are converting this fleeting volunteer activity into more permanent clubs and party organization,⁶ but the manpower of these

changing parties contrasts sharply with the ward or precinct committeeman of the older machines. The new political men are far more likely than their predecessors to be motivated by belief, by loyalty to an attractive candidate (e.g., the Citizens for Eisenhower movement), by a sense of civic duty, or by a more generalized social and sporting enthusiasm. They view their political activity more as avocation than vocation.

The parties also have found fresh resources in the organized power of the interest group. It recruits voters for the favored party or candidate and provides campaign and financial assistance as well. Many a candidate today prizes the contacts and communication channels of the local labor union or chamber of commerce more highly than he does the face-to-face campaign. Voters in many corners of the country can testify that candidates rarely knock on their doors any more. Business and labor are major sources of party funds; the contributions of payrollers no longer suffice. Even the "new style" political leader, in contrast with the classic model of the boss, usually has closer ties to interest groups in the community. He may even have been recruited from one.

For these educated, secure, and even prestigious workers and leaders of the new parties, a political appointment holds little fascination. One sophisticated and experienced politician has written that "Men and women are drawn into politics by a combination of motives; these include power, glory, zeal for contention or success, duty, hate, oblivion, hero worship, curiosity, and enjoyment of the work."⁷ Today's political worker may more and more find his reward in the satisfaction of a deeply-rooted psychological need, the identification with a purposeful organization or a magnetic leader, the ability to serve an economic or professional interest, the release from the tedium of daily routine, or the triumph of an ideal. His "pay-off," instead of a political job,

nals, but the only general work on the volunteer movement in politics of which I am aware is Stephen A. Mitchell's *Elm Street Politics* (Oceana Publications, 1959).

⁷ Stimson Bullitt, *To Be a Politician* (Doubleday and Co., 1959), p. 42. The reader will, in fact, find all of chapter two a stimulating review of the incentives and motives of politics.

⁶ The literature on the California political clubs is rather extensive, especially in the nonacademic jour-

may be endorsement for elective office, membership on a civic commission, access to new and influential elites, or a reception in the White House gardens.

The New Personnel Needs of the Party

These shifts in organization, functions, and personnel of the parties have meant that the patronage that does remain is not the patronage that the parties might easily use. The parties cry for trained, educated, experienced men of ability and affairs, albeit fewer men than formerly. The vast majority of patronage positions are poorly paid and generally unappealing to the men and women of skills and achievement the parties would like to enlist. Very likely the man placed on a trash collection crew will lack the social and political experience to be useful in today's politics, and his meager pay offers the party scant opportunity for fund-raising. The middle-level job, potentially the most useful to the party in rewarding its more capable partisans, is rarely available for political appointment. These are the specialized, expert positions that are generally the first to be put under a merit system. When they do remain under patronage, their specialized qualifications are the hardest to fill from the rank and file of political job-seekers.

At the top, the party often has highly-placed positions available, at least in small number, to reward its leadership corps. Here, however, the party often fails to persuade its most capable men to give up, even temporarily, their positions in business and the professions for a political appointment. In turn, the party workers who would find the patronage position an attractive alternative to their private employment, lack the executive and administrative experience for the positions. Paul David and Ross Pollock write of these problems in the national government:

For positions at the higher levels, the party organization has only rarely been successful in convincing the administration that its nominees were sufficiently qualified. The administration, on its part, has had to go out and hunt, cajole, and persuade in order to recruit the kind of talent it wanted. . . . The supply of persons with the requisite competence and availability is simply not large enough in either political party, and there is

little evidence to suggest that the supply is on the increase.⁸

As its usefulness to them declines, patronage imposes hard and worrisome choices on the party hierarchies. Often the parties' appointments to the plenitude of unattractive patronage jobs go to men and women with no particular record of service to the party and little promise for future service, or whose appointment will do little to integrate the party organization or build party cohesion. Their chief recommendation is their need for a job, and the party, functioning as employment bureau, hopes only for a little gratitude and possible support at the polls. The better paid, more enticing jobs are losing their incentive power for those partisans qualified to hold them, and the party finds itself haunted by the aggressive availability of unqualified job-hunters.

One is forced to conclude that the classic dependence of party on patronage is being undermined on both sides. Forced by the changing nature of American society and by new political problems and values, the parties are shifting to a new mode of operation that relies less than formerly on the incentives of patronage. Patronage, on the other hand, is declining in both quantity and quality, both in the number of jobs available and in their value to the party.

Short-Term Adjustments

Since party changes were not simply adjustments to the gradual demise of patronage, a further reduction in the supply of patronage in those states where the supply remains large will hardly alter the long-run development of the party system. It may, however, accelerate change in party operations or produce short-term side effects.

In the first place, patronage has persisted chiefly at the local levels and remains the bulwark of local party organization, a faintly anachronistic bulwark, one might add, in an era of centralized party and government. It is in these state and local party organs, despite their declining vigor and importance, that one finds the most vocal proponents of pa-

⁸ Paul T. David and Ross Pollock, *Executives for Government* (The Brookings Institution, 1957), pp. 25, 27.

tronage—even of the remaining federal patronage, much of which is channeled through them. This concentration of patronage in the localities fortifies the local party and permits it to resist discipline or centralization by organs higher in the party structure.⁹ Thus fortified, these decentralized pockets of political power also fight party cohesion and responsibility in legislatures and, paradoxically, often nullify the value of executive patronage in achieving legislative discipline.

Inevitably, these local units, as they lose their vitality and their part in major policy-making, become primarily dealers in patronage, converting it from a political tool to a political goal. When patronage declines there, a major resistance to party centralization and to issue-centered campaigns and candidates will die with it.

Secondly, restrictions on patronage weaken the Democratic party more than the Republicans. Patronage appeals more predictably to lower economic strata, to unskilled and semi-skilled workers, to urban dwellers, and to minority groups—all of the demographic groups which, studies show, support the Democratic party. Patronage as an incentive system comports with the economic needs, the understanding of the relationship between citizen and government, and the somewhat exploitative view of politics more common among lower social and economic groups than among the American middle class. Furthermore, the Democratic party also has greater problems in finding substitutes for it. The personal and financial support of the business community are not often at its disposal. The formation of a genteel party, dedicated to a philosophy of government and based on sociability and civic virtue, falls more easily to the Republicans.

Thirdly, since the appeals of patronage are largely economic, its political value and usefulness are apt to be greatest in the remaining pockets of unemployment and economic hardship, for it is there that private employment fails to provide opportunities superior to patronage positions. In these areas, and in the country as a whole if widespread unemployment returns, patronage might enjoy a brief renaissance as a political incentive.

⁹ The classic expression of this view is E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (Rinehart and Co., 1942).

Finally, patronage has been involved in legislative-executive rivalry. Presidents of the United States, harassed by congressional attempts to control patronage through clearance systems and "senatorial courtesy," have been more willing to surrender it than has the Congress. State governors, however, are not so willing to abandon one of the few weapons they have over unruly legislatures.¹⁰ Since the loss of patronage will certainly affect legislative-executive relations in the states more sharply than in the national government, one is justified in supposing that its further loss will make the task of gubernatorial leadership just that much more difficult.

In Conclusion

To expect anything but a further contraction of patronage would be naïve. 1. Patronage does not meet the needs of present-day party operations. Activities requiring a large number of party workers—canvassing, mass mailings, rallies—are being replaced by radio and television. Political costs are so high that assessments on public salaries are minuscule beside the party's cost. 2. Patronage no longer is the potent inducement to party activity it once was. Public attitudes are increasingly hostile to patronage and the political style it represents. Employment in the private economy also provides an increasingly attractive alternative to patronage positions. 3. As a result, the incentives once provided by patronage are being replaced in the political system. The persons who can contribute most to campaigns, in skill and funds, seek different payoffs—prestige, power, or personal satisfaction rather than jobs.

Even though the further decline of patronage will certainly not destroy or seriously hamper the parties, it will produce political shocks and pockets of discomfort. It will probably hurt Democrats more than Republicans, will be slower and more crucial in economically distressed areas, and will weaken the influence of governors on legislative ac-

¹⁰ See Duane Lockhard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1959) for reports of the value of patronage to governors in New England. For instance, he describes patronage as "perhaps the most important of these gubernatorial weapons" in Massachusetts (p. 160).

tion more than the President's influence on Congress.

American political parties have, after all, been getting along without patronage to various extents for some time now, and they have survived. Even many large metropolitan cities, whose patronage needs the scholars emphasize, have managed without it. The political party has its causes and justification deep in the American political process and not in the dispensation of political privileges. Patronage is necessary to a certain type of party operation, but others can be maintained without it. The old machines and local party organizations relied on patronage, but they were rooted in social and economic conditions that are disappearing. As they disappear, so will the parties and patronage they fostered.

Ultimately, the decline of patronage will, among a number of causes, speed the parties to further centralization, to the heightening of their ideological content, to a greater reliance on group participation in politics, to greater nationalization of the candidate image and party campaigning, and to the establishment of some modicum of party discipline.

There is something almost quaint in these days of big parties, big government, and advertising agency politics about a political institution that conjures up images of Boss Tweed, torchlight parades, and ward heelers. As the great day of patronage recedes into history, one is tempted to say that the advancing merit systems will not kill patronage before it withers and dies of its own infirmity and old age.

Knowledge—or the Appearance of Knowledge—Is Power

Members of a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee were openly hostile to the objectives of an agency whose budget request was under consideration. They seemed determined to slash the request after harassing the administrator.

When the agency head appeared before them, he was subjected to a series of grueling questions, culminating in requests for detailed information concerning the exact amount of saving or additional costs which would result from a complicated series of hypothetical shifts in program.

Without even consulting his fiscal and program advisers, the executive responded immediately to each question, citing figures rounded off to the nearest hundred thousand dollars. The legislators were so impressed by his encyclopedic knowledge of the specific details of administering the agency's operations that they unanimously recommended that the budget request be approved in full.

As far as is known, none of them ever read the text of the printed transcript of the hearings closely enough to realize that the figures cited had all been carefully revised during the routine review of the proofs submitted to the department for correction of obvious errors. The published figures were completely accurate, although frequently quite different from those actually presented at the hearing.

—William Brody, Philadelphia Department of Public Health

More on the Network of Authority

By O. GLENN STAHL

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IN a brief statement which appeared two years ago in this journal,¹ I advanced the thesis that "line" and "staff" are hardly distinguishable as indicators of power status. I observed:

1. that so-called staff units usually do and must necessarily carry out functions of command;
2. that there are some activities for which there is an inescapable need for organizationwide adherence;
3. that a staff activity is no more a restricted, specialized function than are individual line segments of an enterprise;
4. that staff functions, having to do with *how* things are done more than *what* is done, assume a special importance in the public service;
5. that it is convenient to think of line and staff as "program" functions and "sustaining" functions, respectively, which interlace with each other in a *network*; that the chief executive controls the organization by means of both the vertical "program" channels and the horizontal "sustaining" channels;
6. that this approach avoids awkward and unrealistic actions or assumptions on the grounds that decision-making can occur only in certain offices in an organization which have been blessed with the label "line"; and that conflicts are reconciled and communication facilitated at lower levels in the organization when there is no presumption of unvarying command superiority of line over staff.

What Was Not Meant

Apparently this statement has provoked a good deal of discussion and reappraisal of some ancient and hallowed concepts. To some extent, however, the objective I had in mind may have been misconstrued. It may be well therefore to make clear what I was *not* saying:

¹"The Network of Authority," 18 *Public Administration Review* ii (Winter, 1958).

► Few recent PAR articles have aroused as much response as Glenn Stahl's "The Network of Authority." Subsequent chapter, conference, and institute discussions indicate a continuing interest in its subject: relationship of line and staff. Here, Stahl supplements his main point, that staff responsibility for sustaining the organization's operations necessarily involve authority, by emphasizing that the means (the way things are done) may be important ends in themselves, particularly in government. He also points to the real devil—overspecialization of both staff and line, in contrast to the usual whipping boy—the alleged domineering staff man.

1. I did not say that the staff or sustaining functions consist *entirely* of command-type activities.
2. I did not mean to discount the valuable and important *advisory and leadership functions* of these sustaining activities.

The main thing I was cavilling at was the purist approach that staff must be wholly advisory and wholly subordinate to all levels of the line. I was concerned that program supervisors down the line are too prone to interpret the activities of the sustaining or staff arms of their chief executives as having no real sanction so far as control over *them* is concerned. I was contending that this not only *should not* be the case but is *not and never has been* the case; that it is impossible to expect a generalist executive to get organizationwide coherence on such matters as budget planning, personnel standards, career development, and public relations policy without depending upon his sustaining units to *apply* some policy judgments for him, to exercise some portion of command authority.

None of this line of reasoning detracts in the slightest from the importance of the advisory function and the "authority of influence." Sustaining units, of necessity, have many areas of activity in which they can only

cajole or persuade. This is as it should be. Staff units should not interpret my remarks as providing them with a theoretical basis for abandoning the "selling" technique and to operate smugly on the assumption that they can tell program directors "where to get off" at any time. These are complementary and supplementary roles, not antithetical ones.

Neither should program officers hide behind my thesis to mask abandonment of their responsibility for a heavy amount of decision-making on their own. Each supervisor is his own personnel man and budget man—up to a point. That there is such a point is what is important. Some conditions must be established organizationwide which set boundaries on supervisory decision-making. Management specialists inevitably become the interpreters and, to a considerable extent, the real enforcers of these limits. But this does not preclude the large discretion ordinarily left in such matters to program supervision.

Incidentally, even if a staff function consisted mainly of a control-type activity, I would still advocate heavy dependence on persuasive techniques. But so would I advocate such an approach for program or line managers in directing their own subordinates.

The Real Villain: Narrow Specialization

In my judgment, the most serious fault in organization life is not the much overworked "interference by staff with the line" but the curse of specialization. I submit that the preoccupation of any specialist, whether line or staff, with the trivia of his profession and his tendency to relate all that goes on about him to the particular orbit of his work assignment, causes more trouble than anything else. This difficulty is *at least* as much a characteristic of program operators as it is of staff specialists. In fact, it can often be more so.

One of the things that has contributed to this has been the over-emphasis on subordination of staff to line. Program managers rationalize degrees of autonomy and independence from other activities in the organization on the grounds that necessary efforts at cohesion and coordination constitute "staff interference." My point is that the independent success of a specialized phase of an organization objective is not always as important as

the intermeshing of programs into the whole purpose—and sustaining activities, with adequate control measures, may contribute a great deal more to this over-all objective than any individual segment of *program* operations.

Perhaps one of the sources of difficulty is the lack of compatibility that sometimes exists between program managers and their management specialists. We know the problems encountered when a dynamic, hard-hitting program leader finds that his staff specialists are not mentally and emotionally able to keep up with him. This naturally makes the relationships with and impressions on subordinate program managers down the line extremely hazardous. At the same time, the reverse circumstances can be true. A dull and unimaginative program leader, not even knowing how to use his staff specialists, may frustrate them and his entire organization because they can make no headway in maintaining the kind of administrative cohesion that is ultimately necessary to a sound product or service.

Where program leadership and management specialists *are* compatible in tempo and depth, the probability of the manager using such assistants to make *some* decisions and to interpret and apply general policy is all the more likely. Here, then, is the central thesis again—that there is an inevitability, an inexorable character to the exercise of command authority by the sustaining units of an organization.

When Means Are Ends

Another implication of the thesis is that once an organization is created, certain sustaining functions—ordinarily alleged *not* to be ends in themselves—turn out to have much more significance than such an allegation would suggest. A good example is the personnel function in the public service. Although echoes of the following thought seem to have diminished in recent years, it has long been fashionable to impress upon the organization man that the personnel function is a "service"; it exists only to serve the prime program objectives of the organization.

The underlying assumption here is that the objectives of the organization are simply derived from the original purposes, that they always are "line" in character, and that objec-

tives do not evolve out of the creation of the organization itself. A few reminders of reality are sufficient to demonstrate the inadequacies of this viewpoint. For example, once an organization becomes a substantial employer in a given community, the community comes to have a critical interest in its behavior as an employer. Even an industrial concern, to say nothing of the public service, illustrates this point. The behavior of the organization in its employment policy, its treatment of its workers, its lay-off practices, and its pay become quite as critical to the organization's acceptance—perhaps even its existence—as does the quality or nature of its product or service. Need I mention strikes—and such—to drive the point home?

The condition, of course, is doubly applicable to the public service. The mere existence of large public organizations creates a public demand for certain fundamental policies as to the management of such organizations. The development of the merit system idea was one of the early manifestations of this. The establishment of budget planning and centralized purchasing were somewhat later ones.

I contend that the public interest in the manner of personnel and fiscal management of a public organization is, or at least can be, quite as significant as the public interest in its program mission. Sometimes it can be even greater. With respect to personnel policy, for example, there can be occasions when it is more important that adherence be secured to a general policy of merit for a governmental jurisdiction than it is for some individual agency in that jurisdiction to expedite a specific program objective more readily by being relieved of the obligation to adhere to such a general policy. This is not invariably true, but it is often the case.

In other words, it is idle to rationalize all of our organization structure and behavior on the theory that the sustaining management activities are invariably and forever subordi-

nate to the initial program objectives of the organization, particularly when it is a governmental organization. It is a mistake to maintain the sanctity of any single program objective *at all costs*. Doing so creates false illusions on the part of some program operators, develops frustrations when they are told to view management activities as legitimate only when they serve as *aids* rather than *inhibitors*, leaves staff specialists dismayed when they cannot help being inhibitors at times, promotes provincialism and a magnified sense of importance of a field of specialization when it happens to be a program specialization, and generally detracts from the maintenance of cohesion and coordination in the government service.

This is not to say that the judgments made in the name of organization-wide sustaining policy are always right, nor that they should be made without regard to the interests and objectives of program administration. The thing to be guarded against is the attitude that program administration is always paramount and that there is no such thing as a proper *method* of doing it—such as sound personnel operations—as an *end in itself*. My thesis simply urges that we accept that *there are these additional ends*, that we can't escape them, and that we should cease whipping program operators and management specialists into a frenzy of philosophical conflict on the grounds that the latter group has no business doing what it is doing.

Whatever conflict must occur between program objectives and sustaining objectives—and there will always be some—should be reconciled on the basis of practicality and a weighing of relative values in the light of total public interest, the law, and all that goes therewith, not on the basis of subordination of one set of aims to another. The problem is not that we really fail to do it this way. It's just that we cause so much misery by constantly insisting that we shouldn't!

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A Long-Range Operating Program

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WHAT will be the major configurations of the operating budget for your agency in 1962? And how about 1965?

If this question were asked concerning your capital budgets for the same years, you could doubtless reach to the shelf and produce a document of at least some validity which would reflect departmental and community plans for the future—particularly if yours is a local government.

Most of us give at least lip service to planning a great many things, but few commit operating plans to paper for all to observe.

Budgeting for One Year—and Beyond

During most of mankind's history, governments functioned without annual budgets. Apparently, fiscal planning was done on much longer cycles. In our time, "conventional wisdom"—as it pertains to operating budgets—seems dedicated to insuring that we see no further than the next December 31. All that lies beyond is abyss and morass, which can be magically converted to reality only by the next appropriation act. Strangely enough, this attitude toward the operating budget persists, without being subjected to widespread criticism, even in those jurisdictions where long-term capital budgeting procedures have been formalized and where the effects which a capital budget is likely to have on future operating costs are predictable.

The fact that long-range forecasting of many operating costs is feasible is not, by any means, intended to deprecate the importance

► "Probably the most effective formal job of long-term operational budgeting is that done in Philadelphia," wrote the executive director of the American Society of Planning Officials recently. Here, a man who was on the inside at its birth and has been a very close outside observer more recently briefly describes the program and how it evolved (quite accidentally), and suggests steps to improve and apply it at all levels of government.

of annual examination of the multitudinous factors which are lumped into that awesome word, "budget." Indeed, the experiences of those governments past and present which have neglected to use this management device clearly indicate that even the most limited approach to budgeting has much to recommend it. However, to the extent that we have permitted the annual budget to become a blinding spotlight on the near future, cutting out any vision beyond, we are depriving ourselves of a very practical and useful tool in administration. The thesis of this paper therefore is: *Continue the annual budget, but continue it as part of a moving, long-range set of budgetary plans which will make more meaningful the decisions of today and the actions of tomorrow.*

Perhaps we should not even use the phrase "long-term budget" but, rather, adapt one from the capital field: "long-term operating program," indicating its similarity to a long-term capital program. For a lack of a more defensible proposal, we suggest the use of a six-year operating program. Under this system, each year the chief executive would cause to be prepared a fairly firm six-year operating program to be formalized by legislative approval before the annual operating budget is

adopted. Such a procedure would force administrators to do some hard thinking on a longer-range basis than is customary or necessary when a one-year view of operations is all the law requires.

Unfortunately, many a department head, budget chief, chief executive, and governing body will cry, "Foul! You are forcing us to reveal our plans well ahead of the time when we hope to hustle them through the governing body. This preview will permit—perhaps even encourage—unwise, self-centered citizens to organize opposition with the same degree of leisure that we administrators have to develop our plans and build our fences."

The Experience to Date

So far as we know, Philadelphia is the only municipality in the United States which has done anything significant with the long-term operating program. We do have modified long-term budgeting in the biennial budgets of a great many of our states, and there was a time when several states were tied to quadrennial budgets. But neither Philadelphia nor the states use a "moving" long-term operating program. The states use simple two-year budgets. At the outset of a quadrennium, Philadelphia's city Administration uses broadly outlined revenue and expenditure projections for the four-year period (in addition to the detailed annual budget), but as the end of a quadrennium draws near, the span of time encompassed by the operating program decreases. In the final year of the quadrennium, the operating program covers exactly the same period as the operating budget—one year. For a time, the Interior Department developed a moving six-year operating program, but it was not submitted to Congress.¹

Even though the present limited application of the long-range operating program idea is hardly a fair test of the device, it seems appropriate to examine the Philadelphia experience.²

In 1952, Philadelphia had a new charter, a

new Mayor, and a new Council. Also, nearly all of the department heads and other top officers were without prior experience in Philadelphia city government. The community was confronted with a substantial deficit in municipal services and huge amounts of deferred maintenance. The incoming Administration decided to revitalize and expand municipal services. To this end, it proposed a revenue program which would have increased general fund income from \$130.6 million to \$167.9 million annually, a rise of 28.6 per cent. The Council authorized revenues which in fact produced an average annual increase for 1953-56 over 1952 of \$33.6 million.

While some of this money was required for salary increases and other employee benefits in 1953, it shortly became apparent that the government did not have the capacity to prudently spend all of the funds appropriated for program expansion in the first year. Moreover, the Mayor had publicly declared that the revenue program for his Administration was complete. Thus the Administration had to manage its financial affairs so it could meet its commitments for the four-year period within the revenue structure ordained in 1952. The Mayor's Cabinet was thereupon instructed to tailor program expansion plans accordingly.

This initial experiment with quadrennial budgeting having worked well, it was repeated by the succeeding Administration (which was, it should be noted, of the same party and faction as the first Administration). The revenue base was expanded by increased taxes at the end of the first year of the Administration, but this time the four-year budget idea was clear from the first. The Council made considerable adjustments in the Mayor's requests for expenditure authorizations, but it voted his revenue requests with only minor changes. The director of finance was required by the Council to lay before it a four-year projection of over-all revenue and outgo.

The Administration has operated within this context during the current quadrennium, as evidenced by the annual budgets for 1957, 1958, 1959, and 1960.

Evolution

On the favorable side, a stable revenue program was established. The Administration

¹ See Norman Wengert and John C. Honey, "Program Planning in the U. S. Department of the Interior, 1946-53," 14 *Public Administration Review* 193 (Summer, 1954).

² Additional description appears as "A Newer Concept in Municipal Budgeting," Special Bulletin 1957D (September 16, 1957), Municipal Finance Officers Association.

knew from the outset the general configuration of the revenue program within which it was obliged to operate. Once the new rates were adopted, businesses and individuals could plan with reasonable certainty for the four-year period. A modest degree of long-term planning of municipal service and expenditure levels also resulted.

Though the building of surpluses is not inherent in a long-term budget, the Philadelphia experiment has included planned surpluses, one advantage of which is to afford the city flexibility in scheduling sales of municipal bonds. (Governmental units in the U. S. have faced rising costs over the past several years so that any long-term budget plan based on a stable tax rate for the entire period will probably involve surpluses during the early years if the tax rates are set high enough so that revenues over the entire period equal expenditures.) There is, of course, a negative aspect of surpluses—the taking of taxpayers' money before it is absolutely needed by the city.

On the adverse side, there may be more chance for temporary surpluses to be used to initiate new programs (or a higher expenditure level for existing programs) which will have to be continued when the surplus is gone. For example, the Administration raised salaries of city employees as of January 4, 1960, financing the increase out of surplus rather than new tax enactments. This pay increase and other benefits were promised at the time the 1960 budget was being considered—coincidentally with the mayoralty campaign—but no tax increases were discussed then; now, however, the Administration is talking publicly of a substantial tax boost, to become effective in January of 1961.

Another defect is that councilmanic examination of expanding programs—while rela-

tively intense in the first year of a quadrennium—tends to be minimal in the succeeding three years.

However, the greatest weakness of the Philadelphia budget as a long-term plan is its failure to move another year ahead annually.

The Next Steps

It would appear that the next step is to develop and present to the public and the legislative body annually (at least on an information basis) a six-year projection of the operating budget. This should perhaps be expressed in fairly broad terms. However, it should reveal the administration's most realistic estimate of future costs. Among the items which should be clearly identified are the following:

1. Projection of revenue at existing rates.
2. Estimated decreases in operating costs to be achieved by increased efficiency or reduction or discontinuance of programs which have passed the peak of public fruitfulness.
3. Estimated debt service costs.
4. Amount, extent, nature, and timing of proposed program expansion.
5. Projection of public employee pension fund requirements.
6. Estimate of recurring salary and other operating costs not specifically identified above.

The list deliberately omits salary and fringe benefit adjustments because it does not seem appropriate to lay out wage rates and fringe benefits too far in advance.

In its early years, a long-term operating program would be experimental, as capital programming has been. Initially, the benefits probably would be small. However, the long-term benefits should be at least as great as those of a well-conceived and well-executed capital program.

For executive leaders the criterion of success was laid down more than 2,500 years ago by Lao Tse (604-531 B. C.): "... of a good leader, who talks little, When his work is done, his aim is fulfilled, They will all say, 'We did this ourselves.'"

—Harlan Cleveland, "Education for Public Complexity," 41 *Public Management* 283 (December, 1959).

Reviews of Books and Documents

Book Review Advisers: Charles S. Ascher, Arthur W. Bromage, Robert L. Oshins

Initiative and Bureaucracy

By PETER M. BLAU, University of Chicago

ADMINISTRATIVE VITALITY: THE CONFLICT WITH BUREAUCRACY, by Marshall E. Dimock. Harper and Brothers, 1959. Pp. 298. \$5.00.

MEN WHO MANAGE: FUSIONS OF FEELING AND THEORY IN ADMINISTRATION, by Melville Dalton. John Wiley and Sons, 1959. Pp. 318. \$6.75.

SOME of the most profound insights into human existence grow out of our realization of the dilemmas that confront us—conflicting forces which pose problems we must deal with but which we cannot completely reconcile. Juxtaposing the forces of life and death, for example, Freud conceived of both libidinal drives that create new life and life-destroying aggressive impulses. Another famous dilemma is that between order and freedom. Without some orderly framework, freedom has little meaning. To be sure, there was absolutely no restriction on Robinson Crusoe's liberty to say what he wished; but this is not what we mean by freedom of speech. Yet the very limits of order that give freedom its meaning also restrict it and thus come into conflict with it. There is no final solution to this dilemma. The combination of order and freedom that appears generally acceptable may, in a different situation or at a different time or for different people, become unduly restrictive of vital freedoms or unduly disruptive of social life.

The Dilemma of Large-Scale Organization

Such a dilemma is inherent in large-scale administration, since the accomplishment of its objectives depends on both an effective organization of the work and the exercise of initiative in carrying it out. The methods and procedures needed for orderly performance

and coordination often impede initiative and creativity, and the freedom to exercise initiative can easily disrupt the systematically organized processes without which administration would turn into chaos.

One or the other horn of this dilemma is often singled out for critical attention. W. H. Whyte deals with the pressures of modern complex organizations that destroy the initiative of their members and produce "organization men." On the other hand, Roethlisberger and Dickson describe how the tendencies of industrial work groups to escape from the restraints of the formal organization interfere with optimum performance as rationally planned by management. Rarer are studies that analyze the dilemma itself by examining the conflict between organization and initiative and the significance of both for effective administration.

The two books under consideration focus upon this conflict between bureaucracy and enterprise, in Dimock's terms, or the routinizing managers and the reorganizing managers, in Dalton's words. Both authors clarify this issue through a series of case studies. Although most of the cases are about business organizations, the authors' inferences are generally applicable to public administration. As a matter of fact, these books are particularly interesting for the student of public administration because they show how similar are the problems of administration in private and public organizations. Even problems widely attributed to the worst features of political bureaucracy, such as power struggles and misapplication of funds, are apparently prevalent in large private business concerns.

Dimock suggests practical solutions to the problems he discusses, while Dalton tends to confine himself to analyzing the problems,

leaving it to the reader to draw the practical implications. Although neither is a cookbook for administrators, Dimock's comes somewhat closer to the how-to-do-it approach than Dalton's, with the virtues and vices this approach has; explicit recommendations for administrators are made, but complex issues are sometimes oversimplified in doing so.

For Vitality: Bureaucracy and Enterprise

The basic paradox of administration is posed in the Introduction of *Administrative Vitality*: "... Vitality in administration ensures growth, which often results in large size. With size comes a need for formalism in structure and method. But formalism breeds inflexibility, rigidity, sluggishness." (p. x) The question Dimock seeks to answer is how administrative vitality—"energy plus endurance, the ability to compete and the power to survive"—(p. 5) can be preserved in the face of the increasing need for formalized procedure consequent to organizational growth.

The two central concepts are bureaucracy and enterprise. After discussing organizational growth and decay, using analogies from such widely dispersed theories as biological growth and Toynbee's view of the rise and decline of civilizations, he devotes the two central parts of the book to a clarification of these concepts. "At its best, bureaucracy is science, technology, and scientific management; at its worst, it is tradition that has long since lost its reason for being." (p. 86) "Enterprise is initiative, innovation, flexibility, empirical shrewdness; and of these, probably initiative is basic to all the others because without this self-starting proclivity there would be no urge to invent, no dare to gamble, no desire to take action outside of established routines." (p. 121) Both bureaucracy and enterprise are seen as important for administrative vitality, but excessive emphasis on either as a threat to it. "Undue emphasis on order encourages efficiency to the point of stagnation, and undue emphasis on flexibility sacrifices the efficiencies of a smooth operation." (p. 44)

The last part of the book is devoted to attaining the proper blend of bureaucracy and enterprise for administrative vitality. Integrative leadership must seek to combine the best elements of scientific management and the human-relations approach in order to en-

courage responsibility, which means disciplined performance for which an employee is accountable as well as willingness to exercise initiative and assume new responsibilities. Such leadership is most likely to come from persons with strong achievement motives.

Decentralization, he says, makes it possible to maintain administrative vitality even in very large organizations, as exemplified by A. T. & T. (although the author presents some evidence indicating that there is not as much decentralization in the Bell System as the officers at headquarters led him to think). (pp. 216-17) Of particular importance for achieving the optimum blend of bureaucracy and enterprise is administration by objectives. By clarifying policies and objectives and giving employees a stake in helping to attain them, management provides incentives for exercising initiative and ingenuity in pursuing organization goals. Detailed rules and regulations are therefore obviated.

Dimock presents the major points of his approach to an administrative theory in bold strokes, often reiterating them for emphasis and drawing upon a wide array of disciplines in support of his arguments. This puts the main principles with which he is concerned into sharp relief, but sometimes at the expense of precision and detail. Thus, while many criticisms made of Weber's theory of bureaucracy are justified, in my opinion some clearly are not. Weber did not deny "that all the elements of bureaucracy inhere in varying degree in all forms of social organization," (p. 84) for this is what his conception implies. And he was *not* "wholly wrong in thinking that impersonality is indispensable to efficiency"; (p. 265) nepotism, favoritism, the reluctance of professionals to provide services to those with whom they are emotionally involved—these are but three of many illustrations of the fact that many aspects of impersonal detachment are important for efficient performance. It is only because impersonality has become so prevalent in contemporary occupational life that we can today refine Weber's insight and show that an all-embracing impersonal approach that pervades relationships even among colleagues tends to be detrimental for efficiency. Another indication of careless use of sources concerns a study of mine, said to show that a state agency empha-

sized legal standards and checking of results more than a federal agency, (p. 99) whereas the finding I reported was the very opposite. (Incidentally, the actual finding supports Dimock's conception of administration by objectives better than the incorrect version he cites.)

These are minor criticisms. Dimock advances a very suggestive thesis: both bureaucracy and enterprise are essential for effective administration but each conflicts with the other. His concern with offering practical solutions, however, prevents him from fully exploiting the potential of his imaginative thesis. If firm leadership is important for administrative vitality but so is decentralization; if strong achievement motives promote it but power struggles are detrimental to it; if human relations should be fostered but cliques discouraged; if these and other conflicting pairs are correct, there seem to be many inherent conflicts in the requirements of effective administration. Dimock, anxious to present practical solutions to problems, does not pursue the analysis of these conflicting forces as far as one might wish. Dalton, less concerned with suggesting ways to solve administrative problems, tends to present more detailed analyses of such conflicts.

Managers Strong and Weak

The concluding chapters of *Men Who Manage* are also concerned with the conflict between bureaucracy and initiative, specifically as it finds expression in two types of managers: the weak, who "are prone to lose sight of goals in concentrating on procedures," and the strong, who are "so accustomed to moving directly toward goals that they readily devise new methods in doubtful situations." (p. 248) When official procedures make administrative tasks difficult to handle, some managers succumb to the organizational pressures and strictly follow procedures. But more managers than Whyte's concept of the organization man would lead one to suspect exercise initiative and successfully cope with the problems by disregarding formal procedures and even engaging in illegitimate practices for the sake of operating efficiency. As a result, the weak have less and the strong have more power and responsibility than their official positions pre-

scribe. Two interesting charts show that the actual relations in the managerial hierarchy are often different from and sometimes the very reverse of the formal blueprint. (pp. 21-22)

Illegitimate but Effective

The main body of Dalton's book deals with the problems that confront managers, the practices they use to solve them, often in violation of official procedures, and the conflicts that arise in the process. Essentially, this study contrasts informal practices and social relationships in complex organizations with the formal blueprint. Many other studies have done this, but Dalton's viewpoint is distinctive, as a list of his major topics indicates: power struggles in the line; conflicts between staff and line; collusion between management and union; unofficial requirements for advancement; misappropriation of funds. The focus here is not merely upon initiative and inventiveness but upon unorthodox practices and illegitimate arrangements, which the author has found prevalent and, indeed, necessary for effective operations in large organizations.

Conflict, but with Alliances

Most studies of informal organizations within formal organizations center upon friendly relations among colleagues and the ways in which these informal ties facilitate work and increase work satisfaction. Dalton, in sharp contrast, is primarily concerned with the power struggles among managers and the methods to which they have to resort to be successful in this struggle and to discharge their responsibilities. The strong manager seeks to expand his influence the better to exercise his responsibilities. But doing so brings him into conflict with other managers. Cliques and coalitions develop in the course of these power struggles, and the conflicts between these groupings of managers are the fountainhead of much of the initiative and change in the organization.

Particularly suggestive is the analysis of the methods used in these power struggles. One tool, for example, is the two way funnel, a person known to gossip who "is given a pseudo-secret, or the equivalent of a proposal, or a projected plan of action by one clique to

carry as a feint or a trial balloon to another, or to those who will understand and probably respond in some helpfully revealing way." (p. 233)

Far from condemning clashes as defects, Dalton considers them indicative of as well as necessary for the dynamic vitality of an organization. Since conditions continually change, an effective organization must adapt itself by undergoing recurrent modifications. The formal structure, however, is somewhat resistant to change and responds only slowly to changing conditions which make new demands on it. This gap between a somewhat obsolete formal organization and contemporary conditions has to be taken up by informally introduced innovations. The informal organization, then, is seen "as one force in necessary change and supplementation of the formal." (p. 237) Responsiveness to change and willingness to exercise initiative and try new methods of attaining organizational objectives cannot prevail without some conflict. More than that: it is in part the challenge posed by these power struggles that provides the incentives for exercising discretion and ingenuity in the interest of promoting efficiency under frequently changing conditions.

If Dalton finds conflict where other students of industrial relations see mostly integration, he also discovers adjustment and cooperation in areas others think of as a source of conflict, for example, union-management relations. Higher management does not always view the union contract as an interference but often "as another control over lower supervision" (p. 126) which helps management discharge its responsibilities. Foremen, caught between the demands of management to avoid formal grievances and the pressure from workers and their union representatives, try to settle grievances informally, enter into alliances with union stewards, and frequently make unofficial agreements with stewards that violate both managerial directives and the union contract. These practices are considered by the author adjustive and functional for smooth operations, as are other questionable or illegitimate practices.

Although promotions are based not so much on technical qualifications as on the ability to get along with the superior and aid

him in his power struggle, these are realistic qualifications given the fact that alliances in the power struggle are essential for effective management. Although funds are often used illegally for purposes different from those for which they were allocated to a department—for instance, a maintenance manager may pay for the repairs of a friendly line manager with the funds that belong to another line manager—this, too, is a necessary social cost to fortify the cliques that serve important functions for the organization. Even misappropriation of funds or labor by managers for personal use—ranging from having their cars washed in the company garage to having a house built on company time with company materials—(pp. 200-202) can be thought of as unofficial incentives that supplement and adjust inadequacies of salaries. Since informal practices make great contributions to the organization, official rewards neither exactly reflect nor serve as a sufficient incentive for these contributions.

These are very imaginative analyses of the administrative functions of illegitimate practices in organizations. In my opinion, the author is to be commended for not letting moral exhortation interfere with his insightful discussion of these practices. A question of quite a different order, however, must be raised. Dalton's argument rests on the assumption that unofficial rewards in the form of misappropriations are related to informal contributions; that promotion on the basis of favoritism enhances rather than lessens operating efficiency; and so forth. Although he recognizes, for example, that these unofficial rewards *may* be "unrelated to contribution," (p. 214) he presents no evidence, impressionistic or quantitative, that there usually is such a relationship. It is not at least as plausible to assume that unscrupulous managers will more freely use company resources for their personal advantage than scrupulous ones, regardless of the informal contributions either make? The author's argument implies that there is an inherent check on the tendency of managers to misappropriate, and if one's misappropriations exceed his informal contributions, he will be deposed or penalized. But such a laissez-faire conception of organizational life ignores the real power relationships; while there are many checks on

lower management, there are few on the top management of a business—only the very indirect ones of the stock market. All these objections would not hold had Dalton bolstered his conclusions with some systematic evidence; unfortunately, he did not.

Imaginative but not Systematic

Let me close by saying that I found both these books very stimulating. What I liked best about *Men Who Manage* were the pene-

trating and insightful discussions of many managerial practices other investigators had not even noticed. What I liked best about *Administrative Vitality* was the clear statement of an imaginative central thesis. What I missed in both—and this reflects the bias of the researcher—was a more systematic analysis of the problems raised by the investigation, a concern with formulating precise questions for future research which would enable subsequent studies to confirm or refine the conclusions of these authors.

Executive Leaders—Career and Political

By JOHN B. BLANDFORD, JR., UN Adviser to the President of Argentina

THE JOB OF THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE, by Marver H. Bernstein. The Brookings Institution, 1958. Pp. 241. \$3.50.

ONCE upon a time a score and more of veterans gathered round an oaken table and reminisced about their many missions for the public weal. Guided by mellow scholarship, molded by faithful scribe, emerged a tale of challenge suggestive of Greek choral drama or Arthurian round-table ballad.

Polex and Carex are to be off to the wars as commanders-in-leadership. Polex, a bit perplexed and hesitant, carries the banner. He will make the strategic plans, the speeches, and the treaties. Carex, confident but watchful of his colleague, mobilizes. He will determine tactics, be responsible for logistics and direct operations.

And off they go. Polex and Carex press their multiple mission of public weal on many fronts. They achieve a measure of success. But they are harassed by their mission-makers and bankers, misunderstood by the peoples whom they seek to help, infiltrated and divided by tensions and plots within their own ranks. To top it all, the reality of field operations plays havoc with the preconceived pattern of their respective responsibilities.

They return—Carex striding and intact, ready for more missions—Polex scarred and supported by Carex, ready for demobilization. Polex departs, but with an inner glow of

pride in his adventure. Carex stays on meditating on future missions and speculating as to his next Polex.

He who will read the detailed story of this crusade will be well rewarded.

The Round Table and the Knights

The Brookings Institution acted with good timing and right priority in turning its institutional spotlight on the area of leadership in the national government. Its Round Table on the Federal Executive produced a rich record of realism. Professor Marver H. Bernstein of Princeton University has skillfully shaped a readable and significant report: *The Job of the Federal Executive*.

The report should be read by the citizen who should better know the life facts of national government at the top, by the political science craftsman who seeks reform, by the career executive who looks ahead, and especially by the potential political executive.

The central purpose of the study was to explore and chart the roles, the relationships, and the environments of political executives and the high level career executives in the executive branch of the national government. The principal explorers and guides were seasoned practitioners, both political and career. Their performance was impressive and their product frank and revealing.

Always hovered over the scene a problem

as old as political parties and governmental reform and as new as big government and the cold war—the problem of reconciling political and administrative considerations in the upper reaches of government operations. This problem was highlighted in the transition from Truman to Eisenhower in 1953. Later a Hoover Commission task force ventured a solution. It proposed a precise boundary line between policy and administration. It would push back the career territory and purge it of policy. Political executives and career executives should not trespass. This solution has not been accepted.

Today the need for answer and action is greater and more urgent. We are entering an era of "competitive peace." We seek fresh inspiration as to national purpose. We look for leadership for a quickened pace toward new national goals. Inevitably attention will focus upon executive leadership in the national government. The roles and relationships of political and top career executives need clarification and strengthening.

The Brookings report is a good point of departure for early action.

The method of inquiry

Twenty-four distinguished persons—principally senior federal executives—met bi-weekly, eight times, around a table in The Brookings Institution and shared generously their individual executive experiences. They were chairmanned by Professor Wallace S. Sayre of Columbia University. Bernstein prepared the agenda and summarized each previous discussion. The verbatim transcript served as the basis for this report.

The product speaks well for the process. The round-table arrangement stimulated frank and penetrating observations. Sayre's chairmanship and Bernstein's secretarial and reportorial contribution gave cohesion and balance. The participants agreed that the round table was a productive method of developing and distributing information, probably more productive, they felt, than interviews with executives "by a student or researcher."

Probably as a result of the method of inquiry, there was an inevitable emphasis on problems and difficulties rather than achievements. The round table participants did not attempt to present a full portrait of the ex-

ecutive nor a balance sheet of his successes and failures. Rather there was concentration on *modus operandi* and the immediate environment.

So the reader must conjure up his own image of a federal executive as he picks up this tale and trail of executive adventure in the federal forest. Along the way the reader should be prepared for fission of old generalizations and perhaps collapse of some earlier assumptions.

The target

Brookings has opened the door to an important field of inquiry in the area of executive leadership. Within this area are multiple missions of surprising variety and range. Moreover many executive "jobs" change in content and performance as personalities and relationships change. Craftsmanship prevails rather than line production. Fluidity and flexibility challenge conformity. It is the province of the individualist rather than the organization man.

Brookings has set a happy precedent in the shift of inquiry from the personnel positions and procedures to personal performance and problems—from the structure and processes of government to the behaviorism of executive leadership.

The coverage

The reader of the report will appreciate the orderliness and balance of the presentation. Three chapters unveil the real jobs of the political and top career executives; three more illuminate the political environment of the executive branch, the Congress, the political parties and the interest groups; and then the report concludes with a triad on recruitment, retention, and orientation of executives.

Bernstein provides the well shaped body of the report and in the process endows it with personality and realism by generous quotations from the round-table record. Happily too, the report moves along at a uniform high level of reconnaissance. It does not distract by long dips into procedural detail.

As Executives See Their Jobs

Some quotations from the round-table testimony will outline the story and perhaps whet the appetite for its revelation and realism.

The political executive when he comes to Washington notes that he "gains power in magnitude of operations and loses in having to share with others the power of decision." He is "shocked to discover that almost all important questions of policy impinge on some other agency." He "does not have the same measuring sticks to help him manage his affairs that the business executive has." Often he does not "talk the language of the career employee," does not know the program of the department and of other agencies and it takes him "a long time to find out." Whereas in business he is "told in advance exactly what the aims and purposes are of the organization," in government he has to find out for himself his role and the aims of the department.

The political executive has a broad mission, including "the task of harmonizing the programs of his agency with the political point of view and the aspirations of his party." But at least one career executive testifies that he "has more political sensitivity than the political appointee who directs him. A political appointee does not necessarily have political acuteness." Furthermore, the political executive discovers that he has a "relatively small area where he can really make policy, compared to the roles of Congress on one side and the career executives on the other." He finds it difficult to "grasp the public interest character of problems and issues." There is concern about the conflict of interest between private interest and public responsibility. He may even wonder "whether it is a good thing to associate himself with a government that many of his associates regard as a great spending machine that is eating away the vitals of our liberties."

And yet we know there are offsetting moments of triumph and satisfaction. At least one alumnus looked backward with satisfaction at the period when he "was wielding a small brush," but "painting on a very large canvas."

The career executive has problems too. A large one looms as he confronts a new political executive. One career man admitted that "a sort of conditioned reflex" leads him to begin to cover up. "To put it plainly the staff is scared." He may even offer to resign. But ordinarily the career executive consci-

entiously approaches the task of orientation of his political associate. Also his job is to explore their prospective and respective roles and "to find out where certain types of decisions are going to be made."

Partly because of this periodic adjustment to transient political executives but basically because of the range of government and the many forms of citizen intervention, the job of the career executive is one of great variety. "It varies from one Secretary to another." And "there is more difference among career jobs than there is between my career job and that of my immediate political boss."

The round-table career executives tended to focus on the subject of political neutrality. One contended that "the career executive must have policy commitments and these commitments must be of the stature to hold men of dedication and capacity." Apparently this type of incentive is ever present because "all of us career executives have testified on the Hill and will continue to do so." In further support a career commentator advises "that overworked and relatively inexperienced non-career executives have tended increasingly to rely upon career administrators to carry part of the load." And still another explains "with all deference to the political executive, who comes and goes, he does not have the same familiarity with program as his career staff."

However, on sober second thought the career executive contends that he gets involved "in political matters not to provide political leadership in resolving political issues but rather to help to clarify the political issues for resolution by political executives." And, he adds, "the able career man can be useful in standing between the political executive and Congress, just as the able political executive can protect his career men from political attack."

Of course the major contribution of the career executive is continuity of governmental effort and of know-how in governmental relationships and processes. So he carries on probably with much feeling of adequacy and achievement until the time of retirement. And yet the round table record includes a few negative footnotes. "Perhaps the one thing that keeps many of our fine people in the service is the lack of confidence in themselves

to cut loose from the government and make their way in a competitive environment." Again, "many people in the federal government are just not exposed to opportunities to get out." "They are often in jobs that have no counterparts in private life."

Despite different origins and preparations, once the introductory period has passed the political executive and the career executive ordinarily move along in programs and projects through much the same environment. Whatever the distinction, their setting has the common landmarks of budget bureau relationships (in terms of honesty or "pockets of fat") and civil service regulations (with long-sought loopholes). They stand shoulder to shoulder in the interagency rivalries and may even agree that "frequent explosions inside an administration can be very healthy. They are an essential ingredient of opinion making in a democracy." Furthermore according to the record, "the executive branch alone cannot define who is a career man and who is political." Congress has its own opinion.

Certainly they both have experiences on the congressional front. Sometimes the relationship is awkward, sometimes reversed, sometimes effective through well rehearsed lateral passes. They both are concerned with the detour of petitioners through congressional halls on the way to the agency. They both are wary of congressional intervention, but either may in a weak moment acquiesce in a congressional veto to the damage of President and executive branch.

Against this background of problems, the concluding chapters face toward solutions. Needs are outlined. Approaches are suggested. But specific solutions are postponed.

The reader will probably lay down the book with a feeling of wanting more and with an urge to press for action.

Where Do We Go from Here?

But new and specific proposals to strengthen executive leadership are not to be ventured lightly. There are deep-rooted vested interests. There must be time to evaluate the impact. There is a Congress to consult. While awaiting further studies and recommendations perhaps we should seek agreement upon priorities.

Profile the executive more broadly and deeply

Another stage of study seems needed to round out the picture of the executive—perhaps case biographies. We need reference to triumphs and defeats in a broader environment of national goals and public impacts. Perhaps the executive exploration might push deeper into the area of science administration, out into the region of government by contract and overseas into economic aid missions. There might be a deeper look into the rigidities and restraints that slow the pace and dull the imagination of executive leadership.

Agree upon more realistic relationships between political and career executives

I suggest that we discard the yardstick of "policy-making" for distinguishing the roles of political and career executives. There should not be this limitation upon the use of top career executives' experience. It should be possible to use his talents fully either in his civil service post or on a career assignment outside the civil service, even in a non-civil service executive post, without losing his career status. Given good sportsmanship by party politicians and cooperation of political executives, the career executive should be able confidently to carry program conception and program presentation well up to the point of significant public controversy and then yield to the political executive. On the other hand the political executive may well bring fresh stimulus to administrative improvement.

The career executive has know-how of the processes of the public service and sensitivity to the public interest. The political executive normally should come from outside the civil service with special insight on national resources and needs and with fresh zeal and purpose for a new stage of national development. This team must be harnessed—these contributions meshed.

Create a positive role for the political executive

The political executive has a mission of great stature, of representation and leadership for evolving national policy and program. This includes a major responsibility for relationships within the executive branch and with the Congress and the public—in other words, for making our system work.

The adequate political executive should enter upon his mission with confidence and enthusiasm, with full orientation and in a positive relationship with the career executive. The top priority task of strengthening executive leadership is here.

There are about 1,100 political executive positions in the federal government. Perhaps a first step is to try to cut down the task of recruitment to a size that is more manageable. There is no pretense that this is easy to achieve. Nevertheless there should be persistent effort to hold the line on numbers of posts, to reduce the number if possible, and to make larger use of the career executive.

Perhaps a next step is to complete the portraiture of the political executive so we can better know where to look, how to appeal, and what to teach.

Then might follow an attempt to put together an educational project that would be both promotional and preparatory. Conceivably such a project might consist of written material for a wide audience and a seminar in Washington for a more selective one. Basically the curriculum should convey information on the role and environment of the political executive that will appeal to a select representation of individuals, institutions, and corporations as *useful* insight into national government affairs at the top level. Beyond that it is hoped that it would, here and there, stimulate readiness to respond when the call comes. It should be possible to make participation seem not only useful but also a form of public recognition and public service.

The partisan political aspects of the role of political executive seem to be so subordinate and of such low priority that they can be omitted from orientation through this channel. There might be bipartisan endorsement of the project and perhaps participation of

both national parties. This should not be allowed to prejudice sponsorship or financing.

A spotlight on such an orientation project should serve increasingly to uncover the basic resources of political executive material.

Strengthen the role of the top career executive

The Brookings report considers a career executive as a person serving under civil service and having a high executive responsibility. At a minimum it identifies 400 to 500 of such officials, principally deputy and assistant agency heads, executive assistants, chiefs of bureaus, and staff officers and assistant bureau chiefs. There are double this number of officials occupying such posts who are outside the competitive civil service. Career executive ranks should be increased in numbers and some non-career posts should be converted to career. Career ranks might be augmented and their collective range of experience widened by moderate lateral admission from outside.

The career executive, as well as the political executive, should contribute from a position of strength.

Toward a Greater National Purpose

Sputnik and Quiznik are driving complacency and cheapness out of the temple of national life. The demand for more purposefulness, more progress, and more quality will impact heavily on the nucleus of executive leadership in the national government. The political and career executive must sharpen their traditional tools of program projection and management improvement. Then they must reach for something more—greater science orientation, more enlightened individualism in public administration, new stimuli and motivations for continuous growth and development, and a working environment charged with urgency.

Rx for a Sick Body of Knowledge—Business Administration

By JOHN D. MILLETT, Miami University

HIGHER EDUCATION FOR BUSINESS, by Robert A. Gordon and James E. Howell. Columbia University Press, 1959. Pp. 491. \$3.50.

THE EDUCATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN, by Frank C. Pierson and others. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959. Pp. 740. \$7.50.

THESE two volumes report the results of separate inquiries into education for business administration by American colleges and universities. The first was sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the second by the Carnegie Corporation. While the two groups of authors were in touch with each other and exchanged information, they nonetheless cover much the same ground and essentially make the same findings and conclusions. It is indicative of the current state of self-consciousness, and of the importance of the subject, that two of our leading foundations should simultaneously have undertaken these large-scale studies.

Because it is shorter, more coherent, and somewhat easier to read, I suspect more attention will be given to the volume by Gordon and Howell. Moreover, Columbia Press has also published a paper back edition at an even cheaper price. Nonetheless, there are parts of the volume by Pierson and his collaborators which anyone seriously interested in education for administration will not want to miss. I felt this especially about Part Three, "Developing the Curriculum," in which six different authors contribute as many chapters.

Both studies begin with a common point of view. As stated by Gordon and Howell, business education in the United States is "... gnawed by doubt and harassed by the barbs of unfriendly critics." Pierson is more specific in his criticism of education for business administration. Academic standards are too low and need to be increased, the most promising students are not given work commensurate with their abilities, some subjects such as secretarial studies and office practice are not worthy of a four-year college, the body of knowledge for business administration is "painfully small," and there is a tendency in the curriculum "to build up areas and sub-areas far beyond their true academic worth."

Education for What?

The questions to which both studies direct attention will seem familiar to students of public administration. What is the business administration for which our colleges and universities are educating? And what kind of knowledge and technique should be communicated in an effort to develop an individual's abilities and capacities for business management?

Gordon and Howell are perhaps the more explicit and the more imaginative in trying to answer these questions. "*It should be the primary objective of collegiate business education to prepare students for personally fruitful and socially useful careers in business and related types of activity.*" (italics in original) In "Business as an Occupation"—the authors are reluctant to label business administration a "profession" in the absence of a well-defined and accepted code of ethics—they point out that the business firm is first an organization, "a system of consciously coordinated personal activities." Organizational behavior is therefore an important factor in business management. The second facet of business management the authors define as the "nonmarket environment"—the political and economic system, the state of technology, the aggregate of national income and employment, the state of international tension. The third facet is the "market environment." The fourth is "economic management," the utilization of resources of labor, plant, and supplies in the production and sale of particular commodities or services.

To master these four aspects of business administration, Gordon and Howell recommend that at least half of a four-year undergraduate program be devoted to general education. The professional part of the curriculum should introduce the prospective business administrator to these subjects: (1) managerial accounting and statistics, (2) advanced economics, (3) organization and administration, (4) courses in "functional fields" such as marketing and labor relations and finance, (5) the

business system (legal, political, and social), and a capstone course on business policy. The remainder of the volume discusses these curricular ideas, as well as the quality of students and instructional staff, graduate programs, and the need for continuing research.

These same concerns in somewhat greater detail and more discursive terms are also considered in the Pierson volume. I was especially impressed by the chapter on "Managerial Decision Making as an Organizing Concept" written by Dean George L. Bach of Carnegie Institute of Technology. At the graduate level

(the master's program), he advocates a focus on (1) the administrative process and organizational behavior, (2) economic analysis, (3) quantitative method, and (4) the "functions" of marketing, production, and finance. The second year program would stress business policy and the business environment.

In comparing education for business administration with that for public administration, the reader will find a wealth of ideas in these volumes. It will be interesting to see what changes will result in the business curriculum and content.

The World as Employer

By WALTER H. C. LAVES, Indiana University

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE: PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS, by Tien Cheng Young. International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1958. Pp. 268. \$5.00.

IN this compact little volume the author, himself an international civil servant with UNESCO, presents a summary of most of the principal problems that have been faced in creating the international civil service of our day. These include the issue of national and international loyalty, political neutrality, international immunity, geographic distribution vs. efficiency, equal pay for equal work, staff rights and morale. The appendix includes the staff regulations of the United Nations and a draft proposal emanating from UNESCO on the development of basic training facilities for international civil servants.

The experiences of the League of Nations and the United Nations agencies naturally constitute the focus of most of the discussion. Little if any reference is made to other international civil services. The method used is essentially that of identifying problems, citing League practice with commentary thereon, and then presenting the current United Nations practice.

In his presentation Young maintains a nice objectivity though he does not hesitate to make clear what in his judgment are the requisites for successful personnel administra-

tion in the United Nations system. However, given his own official position, he attempts no argumentation to persuade the reader regarding any particular issue. Perhaps for the same reason he does not discuss the human and managerial problems that are involved in developing and maintaining a high quality civil service within any one international agency. But his quotation from Carl J. Hambro that "What we need on the Secretariat of the League is not a system but men and women," suggests to this reviewer what he has in mind. Unfortunately the dynamic forces that day by day mold the character of an agency's international civil service do not, perhaps cannot, receive the attention they deserve from writers and commentators. Little has been written on this aspect of a Secretariat which, given the framework discussed by Dr. Young, determines the success of international work. Rules, regulations, rights and salaries are basic to a good international civil service, but they are only necessary means to accomplishing the true purpose of international organizations. Leadership, motivation, dedication, professional competence and clear program objectives are the forces that make worth while the preoccupation of men with the important topics discussed here.

The great merit of this book is its clarity in presenting the problems faced by mankind in developing its international civil service for

doing the world's governmental business. It presents solutions in the context of principles that have guided both the best national and international services and which must be maintained if the structure of any civil service is to be a lasting one.

The International Institute of Administrative Sciences is to be commended for publish-

ing this manuscript. Through its worldwide membership and a vigorous promotion program the volume should be put into the hands of government administrators and others who make national policies in relation to the strengthening of the international civil service—a pioneer task still on the frontiers of thinking on public administration.

in this number

(Continued from page ii)

James A. Perkins, vice president of the Carnegie Corporation and Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, invited the PAR symposium on university administration from persons who have been working on Carnegie-financed research in higher education. He also has been vice president of Swarthmore University, assistant director of the Princeton University School of Public and International Affairs, and, more recently, deputy chairman of the Defense Department Research and Development Board.

Frank J. Sorauf, assistant professor of political science, Pennsylvania State University, has concentrated on politics and political parties. He is now

studying political careers and recruitment of Pennsylvania state legislators under a Social Science Research Council grant and has published in the *American Political Science Review*, *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, and the *Journal of Politics*.

O. Glenn Stahl has served three federal agencies—TVA, Federal Security Agency, and now the Civil Service Commission, where he heads the Bureau of Programs and Standards. He has carried William Mosher's text, *Public Personnel Administration*, into a fourth edition and has written many journal articles as well as teaching part-time at three universities and the Department of Agriculture graduate school.

Developments in Public Administration

Compiled by WILLIAM B. SHORE

Publications Officer

American Society for Public Administration

To Free Government for Policy Leadership

There is no question that governmental budgets and policies are expanding, but that does not mean "a simple expansion of a monolithic bureaucracy." Except for the Postoffice, most federal agencies "have made some more or less deliberate effort to rely for the operation of their programs on the organized cooperation of agencies that are at least partially independent in their administration," according to Don K. Price. ("Creativity in the Public Service" in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, eds., *Public Policy*, 1959 Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University.)

State governments were the first agencies to which the administration of federal programs was delegated, as the establishment of land-grant colleges grew into the major federal grant programs of today. Where states seemed unsuitable administrative agents, special organizations such as soil conservation districts, local public housing corporations, or national government corporations were formed.

Though the independence of public corporations was eaten away by the line agencies, to the disappointment of their early advocates, the idea emerged in two amended forms—(1) corporation-like units within line agencies operating on a revolving fund to "sell" goods and services to program units and (2) contracts with private organizations, many established primarily to handle government work. The trend toward delegation to somewhat independent units might be illustrated by contrasting the establishment of a wholly government organization to inspect steamboats set up in the last century with the licensing of private firms to inspect airplanes

as arranged in this century. Now, even such thoroughly governmental activities as the study of military weapons, tactics, and strategy are performed by nongovernmental corporations.

With What Implications?

Nobody yet knows, Dean Price reflects, whether this is a device to support "private enterprise in preference to bureaucracy, or alternatively whether it is a means of extending government control over business operations. It can be either. And it will probably be some of both."

Government *could* control every detail of operation by the contracting corporation, but both Congress and the Executive Branch seem "relieved to find a device which lets great segments of urgent and complex business get done by a method of delegation that is politically respectable."

Few if any fields of activity need be excluded from delegation by contract. We already delegate major foreign policy tasks through the International Cooperation Administration; the staff work for "the fundamental review of our international security position" by the Gaither Committee was performed under contract. But that does not mean that delegation by contract is always desirable. If it is more appropriate salaries or less red tape that makes delegation to private organizations seem desirable, perhaps the government should arrange for these advantages within its own agencies.

The Case for Contracting

"The best case for the contractual system" is that it gives the government "a measure of detachment from . . . operational management" that is essential so that top administra-

tion can "best direct its attention and energies to its essential problems—the determination of objectives, the scheduling of its program, the coordination of the various elements of that program, and the continuous evaluation of progress toward the main purposes of the organization."

This detachment may be attainable in business by internal delegation—though the largest corporations, such as General Motors, use subsidiary corporations for this purpose. But in government, politicians and journalists hold the administration responsible for operational details if delegated internally but less so if delegated externally. Further, the corporation device provides a continuing corps of high-level experts who are outside the government and so free to criticize, yet are within the official orbit and so have access to secret data.

Some Possible Problems

Nevertheless, the intermingling of private and public business in a private corporation will raise problems, Price warns. (For some examples, see also Harold C. Petrowitz, "The Battle Over Proprietary Interests in Defense Contracts" and Sumner Marcus, "What Is Appropriate Public Policy for Profit Renegotiation?" 2 *California Management Review* 59 and 34 (Fall, 1959) and David B. Johnson, "Some Problems of Cost-Plus Contracts" 19 *Public Administration Review* 219 (Autumn, 1959).) They point to difficulties in establishing rights to designs and processes developed under or related to government contracts and in avoiding excess profits made under contracts where costs cannot be estimated in advance. These problems suggest that there could be major effects on business and perhaps on the national power structure from the growing government-business contracts. The additional contracts are not mainly purchases from a warehouse, which could be handled at arm's length by sealed bid, but generally must be negotiated and require close day-to-day working of government and business administrators, more government surveillance of internal business affairs, and emphasis on public service or prestige rather than maximizing profit in some instances. One might even ask such questions as whether this entry of business into the actual operations of government and vice versa will intensify the bureaucratizing trend some note in corporation practices—

which seem more and more to aim at permanence, expansion, and good community-public relations rather than high profit—and whether it will unbalance the countervailing power of the massive interest groups which some observers claim exists.)

Some Suggestions for Improvement

Also pointing out the "striking desocialization" and the redesign of the free-enterprise system taking place, John J. Corson observes that Congress and newspapers criticize the new arrangement and that too little is said of its virtues. But, he acknowledges, contracting practices can be improved:

1. The government must decide at what stage to delegate—the Army, Navy, and new space agency plan programs thoroughly before delegating; the Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission rely on contractors "to conceive and develop programs as well as weapons." The Budget Bureau's circular, "Use of Management and Operating Contracts," (A-49, February, 1959) "was a first and much-needed step" but needs supplementing in each department.

2. Government must trust the contractor more, designing contracts that maximize incentive and relate profit to the quality of the product, speed, and economy.

3. Techniques must be developed for fixing responsibility without too-close supervision even when new products are being developed.

4. Corporations "must accept their substantial social responsibilities."

5. The government must keep adequate technical staff to conceive what is needed, work with industry on plans, and keep informed on technical problems. ("Government and Business: Partners in the Space Age," 48 *Management Review* 9 (September, 1959).)

As to improving noncommercial organization contracts with the government (specifically ICA contracts with universities), one contractor urged ICA to do more evaluating of contractor programs and to cover overhead costs, particularly the heavy costs preceding the signing of the contract. ("For profit contracts, this kind of risk-taking may be all right.") Even costs of adapting university staff and facilities and of training the staff to the new tasks might logically be covered. As to contractors, some have rushed into programs for which they were ill-adapted, and many have relegated government work to a second-

ary position. A number have resisted coordination with related government work activities. But there have been recent improvements in procedural relationships, and, on balance, the contract device "has worked" and "been considerable gain." (Henry Reining, Jr., "The Government Contract as an Administrative Device," 323 *Annals* 68-79 (May, 1959).)

A 1956 study for the Senate Special Committee to study the Foreign Aid Program (also contracted for—from Jerome Jacobson Associates) supports most of Reining's observations, underscoring his complaints about failure to provide sufficient overhead by showing that contractors receive a far smaller percentage of both gross value and salaries than ICA's own overhead figures. Salaries under contracts, while somewhat higher (7½ per cent over-all, 15 per cent for engineers), do not bear out "generalizations which are frequently made . . . that contractor personnel cost much more than Government personnel. . . ."

Cost differences between contract and direct operations of technical assistance are "generally minor and . . . are usually of lesser importance than the other considerations." These are: "when the need is for a complex of skills, specialized facilities, and a team in depth with support not available in Government," or speed of recruiting and beginning the job, relationships with foreign governments (under certain circumstances, a contractor can circumvent foreign policy complications), and control and supervision. ". . . Contractors generally rate well on most counts and wider use could be made of their services." ("The Use of Private Contractors in Foreign Aid Programs," March, 1957.)

The Administration has been pressing to expand more traditional areas of contracting and now requires contracting out of all "commercial industrial activity," for "the twofold benefit of furthering the free enterprise system and permitting agencies to concentrate their efforts on their primary objectives." (Budget Bureau Bulletin No. 60-2, September 21, 1959.) The burden of proof is on the agency to show that an exception is warranted. Reasons might include (1) national security (though commercial firms can operate in national security fields with proper safeguards), (2) costs (but commercial charges must be "relatively large and disproportionately higher" when figures are precisely comparable, including "all direct

and indirect outlays" such as self-insurance and adjustment for taxes) and (3) "clear unfeasibility" (if the product is "an integral function of the basic mission of the agency" or not available from private firms and not likely to be).

Some in Opposition

There is some opposition—for example from the American Federation of Government Employees, which is lobbying against extensive contracting, claiming that costs often are higher than for direct operations. AFGE won an ally in the Air Force Chief of Staff who issued a memorandum last summer stating: "The command financial plans display an alarming tendency toward turning over our responsibilities to contractors. This can only result in the development of a detached monitoring or surveillance attitude on the part of our force rather than the feeling of direct responsibility for accomplishment of the assigned task." (*The Government Standard*, July 31, 1959, pp. 1, 2.)

Many congressmen also have expressed strong skepticism about contracting out. The House Subcommittee on Manpower Utilization "finds it difficult to understand the basis for the Federal Government to contract to companies, primarily established to make money, such jobs as training, management reviews, space studies, custodial services, and general research. At the same time the Government has both the trained personnel and the facilities to do the work that was contracted out," according to the subcommittee chairman. Furthermore, "the Government Operations Committee has . . . found some shocking instances of contracting-out practices. The Armed Services Subcommittee . . . is examining into Defense Department military contracts. . . . And the Mahon subcommittee put into the report on the Defense Department appropriation bill clear-cut language prohibiting the contracting out of professional services except where there is absolutely no choice in the matter from a national defense standpoint," a congresswoman observed to the Subcommittee.

Some practices questioned by or before the subcommittee included contractors paying very low wages, delegating to contractors inspection of their own work, contracting on cost-plus basis such jobs as manual and catalog

writing, and contracting out services such as hospital laundering which are generally held to be handled more efficiently as an integral part of the operation. ("Manpower Utilization in the Federal Government," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Manpower Utilization, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., July 15, 22, 29 and Sept. 2, 1959.)

Missing Links in the Chain of Command

Many business executives are ineffective in leading their subordinates to better performance because persons at different echelons in the organization often see the same job in a different way and because executives often evaluate and discuss a subordinate's work with him in ways which inhibit rather than encourage improvement, according to studies published by the Foundation for Research on Human Behavior and a survey of performance appraisal research by the United Air Lines personnel research manager. (*Communication in Organizations: Some New Research Findings* (1959) and Kenneth E. Richards "A New Concept of Performance Appraisal" 32 *Journal of Business* 229-243 (July, 1959).)

In the Foundation studies, pairs of supervisors and subordinates (the latter chosen by the former) were found to disagree sharply on important aspects of the subordinate's job. Seven of 33 pairs, for example, did not even list the same duties for the subordinate and another 13 pairs had only "medium" agreement. And this was the most agreement found. When it came to questions of job and skill priorities, job obstacles, and possibilities for change, at least half of the pairs had low agreement and very few had high. "Subordinates often see few possibilities for change whereas the boss is aware of many," and "the boss seldom knows the problems which are of greatest concern to his subordinates."

The different vantage points of boss and subordinate apparently present such a gap of understanding that even after boss and subordinate were told of the study results, earnest efforts of some bosses to reach understanding failed: when asked whether they had talked over differences, seven pairs disagreed on whether they had or not! In six pairs, the boss thought they had, the subordinate did not; in one, the subordinate thought they had. "A cure for communication difficulties

of the order revealed here will not be achieved in a single 'let's talk turkey' session," the researchers warn.

Two interesting sidelights: if the boss had not held the subordinate's job previously he communicated with him more readily than if he had; the more ambitious the subordinate, the less agreement he had with the boss on job problems—perhaps, the researchers suggest, because he was never willing to admit his problems to his boss.

Another researcher found that persons at different levels of the hierarchy of a small company looked at jobs and people generally in different ways. Upper managers tended to judge people by their class and background; lower managers by their power; workers by their reliability, authority, and pay. Managers at all levels judged jobs by power and pay, but workers judged them by their requirements and pay. Distinctions among jobs were blurred by distance—top managers lumping workers, welders and clerks together and workers sharply distinguishing these but lumping clerks, personnel directors and teachers together. These differences in frames of reference apparently inhibited communication and friendliness. Bosses and subordinates who judged jobs and people on a similar basis liked each other more and communicated more effectively.

One "basic lesson" is suggested by both of these (and two related) studies: transmitting valid, reasonable and valuable information is not enough to "insure its acceptance. If people will accept this fact, it will reduce, or at least make understandable, the frustrations which arise in communicating, persuading and training."

Failures of Performance Appraisals

One additional finding: communication between superior and subordinate was no better in companies with performance appraisal programs than in companies without; on some factors it was worse. Reasons are suggested by Richards—some borrowed from other observers, some derived from United Air Lines studies. Men resist rating other persons particularly when they must act on the basis of that evaluation. Also, they find honest ratings impractical. (If I rate my subordinate low, my boss will criticize me for letting him go

this long; if I rate him high, it will be hard on both of us if I have to drop his rating next time; also, low ratings make people mad.) So most ratings end up right in the middle, even where evidence indicates that the boss does not think well at all of the man he rated "satisfactory." Evidence of higher ratings for friends than for others also has been compiled.

Appraisals can work, Richards asserts, if they are used as a supervisor's tool to improve day-to-day performance of immediate subordinates. But if salaries are related to appraisals, supervisors will emphasize good points rather than needed improvements. And attempts to standardize ratings of all supervisors so they may be compared at higher levels must fail due to varying viewpoints of raters. (Would Eisenhower's rating of MacArthur be the same as Truman's?)

Even when the appraisal consists of a face-to-face discussion focused on performance improvement and unrelated to promotion or salary, it will not succeed unless the supervisor understands common blocks to the subordinate's responding the way the supervisor hopes he will. If the subordinate doesn't see himself much as the supervisor does, the subordinate cannot accept the supervisor's suggestions. The subordinate will build up his defense mechanism to protect his self-image, using energy he should be applying to growth.

UAL tries to overcome these difficulties by eliminating grades and using appraisal reports mainly as the basis for supervisor-subordinate discussion. In the talks, supervisors encourage the subordinate to initiate proposals for change. To help the supervisor do this well, he reviews his report with his own superior before approaching the subordinate and also goes through a training program to sensitize him to conditions which are opportune for changing behavior. (One UAL study showed that half of the employees who indicated little anxiety about appraisal discussions saw them as a means for improved performance, but only 8 per cent of those showing anxiety and none of those who were downright defensive about being appraised saw the talks as leading to self-improvement.) After two years, the new appraisal program's acceptance is "excellent" though "complete understanding and skill in using the program" need further development.

The Right to Know (continued)

The House Government Information subcommittee continues its running battle with the Executive over what the public should know of government operations. More than 30 occurrences during the year ending July, 1959 were cited to show suppression by executive agencies of information the subcommittee felt should be public. More of the criticism than in the past was aimed at delay in releasing information solely to arrange the best publicity break for the agency or the Administration.

Some victories for Congress were noted, but nearly all were relatively minor, for example:

—A county Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation committee had erroneously denied public inspection of sugar beet allotment records and the subcommittee's intercession brought the undersecretary of agriculture's view that the records should be open.

—A veteran, curious about a news note that a doctor had earned large sums X-raying for the army, had failed in a nine-year persistent request, through congressmen and senators, to find out just how much the doctor had earned. The subcommittee found out for him.

—A navy inventor was provided with a test report on his invention through the subcommittee's intervention after he had tried to get it for ten years.

—The Defense Department instituted a program to declassify old records.

—Congress required by law the opening of Internal Revenue Service files on tax exempt organizations; 117 requests for information had been granted. (Committee on Government Operations, "Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies (Progress of Study, August 1958-July 1959)" House Rpt. No. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.)

On major questions, however, "the subcommittee, despite its furious efforts, keeps finding itself in the same place," member Clare E. Hoffman complained.

Two statutes sponsored by the subcommittee apparently have failed to free information. The amendment to the 170 year old "house-keeping" law—cited often as the basis for withholding executive branch information—

failed to change information policies even of those departments that had cited the old law as authority for secrecy. A rider on last fall's Mutual Security Appropriations Act provided that the General Accounting Office and any subcommittee or committee of Congress should have access to any document related to programs financed by the appropriation, unless the President publicly forbids its release and explains his reasons. The President did just this in the first test of the law, a request for an evaluation report of International Cooperation Administration programs in several countries. Disclosure, the President said, "can . . . tend to impair or inhibit essential reporting and decision-making processes"—the same explanation executive branch spokesmen have given the subcommittee for several years. (A major segment of one of the country reports finally was given to Congress, however.)

The executive branch successfully resists the subcommittee's efforts to open its internal documents to public scrutiny, implying that administrators must be held responsible for final acts not procedures, preparations, and preliminary plans and that answering every

question of every inquirer so he really understands the answer would halt the whole executive machinery. The subcommittee continues to feel that "the bureaucratic attitude which holds that the people must justify their right of access to Government information requires a continuing congressional pressure to remind Federal agencies that 'public business is the public's business.'" Discouraged with this statement, Rep. Hoffman urges that the judiciary be asked "to lay down broad, general rules governing" withholding of information through a friendly suit for contempt of Congress arranged with an executive agency.

To meet the problem of overclassifying security documents, Senator Clinton Anderson suggests "as severe penalty on those placing a restricted tag on unrestricted information as is now provided for those revealing secret data. . . . No officer was ever denied promotion for saying nothing." We are failing to progress in some security-related programs because of over-restrictions on data, Anderson claims. ("Top Secret"—But Should it Be?" *New York Times Magazine*, May 3, 1959, p. 14.)

Washington—as Seen by a Music Critic

Washington should be the steadfast showcase of our values. And in the arts, this showcase should be large, diverse and vivid. . . . In a city where policy is made by a few top officials, the habit of initiative has been lulled in many able and imaginative people. The permanent residents . . . should fight hard to prevent the image of the capital being formed by innocents and know-nothings whom the voters continue to elect.

—Howard Taubman, *New York Times* music critic, "Does Washington Lack Culture?" *New York Times Magazine*, December 27, 1959.

IN ANALYZING UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION

GENERAL propositions about large-scale administration may not be wholly applicable to colleges and universities. To illustrate: A good administrative design (1) will be adapted to the size of the staff, (2) will implement institutional purpose, not twist purpose to design, and (3) will adapt to the characteristics of the persons whose performance determines how fully the organization's purpose is achieved.

1. The average size of faculties at all institutions of higher education is about 160; the average university has less than 600 faculty members; only about a dozen have more than 2,000. The problem is not one of large-scale administration.

2. The college or university exists for two purposes: to teach and to advance knowledge by scholarly research.

3. These functions are performed by individual professors. It follows that their characteristics importantly determine whether administrative design fits institutional purpose.

Three characteristics offer clues to understanding that curious person, the professor. He is first of all a professional man. He is irritated when a university official with a business background addresses the faculty as "employees" or threatens to hire replacements for any who "don't like it here." Like the relation of physician to patient, that of teacher to student is peculiarly private, even in a large lecture hall. The university is a professional partnership, a "community of scholars"; it cannot operate through orders from the top.

A professor is, secondly, a specialist. Chemists are not interchangeable parts, nor are historians. Theirs are the vices as well as the virtues of specialization, including that mixed vice-virtue of thinking their own subject terribly important.

Third, the professor as scholar is an explorer of the unknown. As such, he must be

both rational and imaginative. He is perhaps the truest entrepreneur in our society, risking his energy, time, and reputation on his guesses as to where to plunge into the wilderness of the unknown, what tools to use, what hazards to anticipate. Small wonder that he is not an "organization man."

Because he is a professional, a specialist, and an explorer for truth—that most elusive of all the essences—the professor is engaged in the most private enterprise in pursuit of the most public purpose in our society.

As he sees it, the conditions for achievement of institutional purpose are four: freedom of inquiry; freedom of teaching; recognition of professional competence; and a policy voice for the community of scholars. The last of these is puzzling, for professors complain of spending precious time in policy meetings. To tell the truth, their specialism and individuality reduce their effectiveness in collective decision-making. But they feel they need a policy voice to protect the other three conditions for institutional health; for they sense that, alone, trustees and presidents may not be able to resist contrary pressures sometimes brought by alumni, parents, legislatures, foundations, government agencies, and professional, occupational, and patriotic organizations. (Twelve college and university administrations and boards of trustees are now under formal censure by the American Association of University Professors for violation of principles of academic freedom and tenure.)

University administration will profit from critical examination by students of administration. Their prescription, however, will have relevance only if it starts from correct premises—about size, institutional purposes and conditions for their achievement, and the characteristics of the persons through whom these purposes are achieved.

JAMES W. FESLER
Editor-in-Chief

IN THE WAKE OF THE BREAKTHROUGH

In today's world, no one can "complete an education." *Margaret Mead*

American lawyers today are confronted with problems of vast and increasing complexity. No law school education can be expected to deal with all of these problems. A practicing lawyer has an obligation to continue his education throughout his professional life. *Joint Committee of the American Law Institute and American Bar Association*

Most urgently, we should improve and expand educational opportunities for those who bear public responsibilities . . . *The Directors of the Fund for Adult Education*

THESE are a handful of warnings that knowledge is rushing forward, dragging us all into more complicated situations. And the new knowledge needed to cope with situations wrought by new knowledge produces new need for knowledge. Weary of the flood of answers—themselves creating questions—that pile up in our bookshelves and clog our in-baskets, we often are moved to demand that scientists help us resist change instead of propelling us into "progress."

Using agriculture as an example, Henry M. Wriston wrote: "Better seeds, better fertilizers, better machines, and better management have produced astounding results. Yet we see these things, not in terms of triumph, but as problems." The breakthrough of knowledge is triumph, however, and the new understanding of self and world can greatly enlarge freedom.

Despite the striking expansion of all adult education, it is the professional societies which by and large maintain responsibility for continuing vocational education. As the committee of lawyers stated: "The organized bar has the primary obligation to make this continuing legal education available to the members of the profession." Because the member of a professional association identifies with it and guides it to some degree and because its leaders are drawn from the ranks, such groups tend to provide suitable conditions for learn-

ing. "The starting point of all teaching . . . must be where the learner is, not where the speaker would like him or expects him to be" (to quote Nathaniel Cantor in *The Learning Process for Managers*).

It is the filtration, translation, and transmission of new information and insights that is the overriding purpose of the American Society for Public Administration.

There are many types of information of use to public administrators. One provides a relatively simple "better way"—to respond to complaints or keep employees informed or handle sick leave. This type apparently needs only to be conveyed to be put into practice. Another type involves major innovation though technique oriented—installing a performance budget or making a computer feasibility study. Here the administrator must not only adopt and adapt but also add a good deal of his earlier knowledge. A third type of information is not usable in itself. It must be absorbed into the whole being of the administrator—for example, studies of the personality of political leaders, the motivation of employees, or communication blocks. Many such insights, psychologists warn, can be of value only when we are mature enough to accept major change in ourselves.

ASPA seeks to convey all three types of knowledge. The *Review* emphasizes the third, the *News* emphasizes the first and second. Conferences and chapter meetings present a mixture.

Just when and how administrators develop and use new knowledge are not really known, though there are a few helpful descriptions (e.g., Cantor's) of acquiring the more ego-threatening types. Perhaps if administrators were more self-conscious about how and under what conditions they absorb new ideas, the process of conveying them might be more effective.

WILLIAM B. SHORE
Staff Editor

A comparative and interpretive summary of the role of state governments in the scientific effort of the nation and the significance of scientific research in state government. . . .

SCIENCE AND STATE GOVERNMENT

A Study of the Scientific Activities of
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By FREDERIC N. CLEAVELAND

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Dr. Cleaveland gives major attention to the scope of scientific activities as measured by dollar expenditures and professional manpower allocated to them. He considers the relative emphasis given to basic and to applied research in four major areas of state governmental activity: agriculture; resource development and public works; health, education and welfare; and higher education. He examines state policies governing scientific work, alternative patterns of organization for the conduct of research, and methods employed in formulating and coordinating scientific programs in the six states. He analyzes and appraises research needs in relation to existing research programs, he reviews state-federal relations in scientific activity, and he investigates the work environment that state agencies provide for their scientist.

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